The Dollar and the Policy Mix: 1985 by Jeffrey D. Sachs
JEFFREY  D.  SACHS 
Harvard University 
The  Dollar  and 
the  Policy  Mix:  1985 
IN  1971,  Robert  Mundell  proposed  a  stunning  solution  to  the  three 
problems then affecting the U.S.  economy:  high inflation, high unem- 
ployment,  and a weak currency.  His essay  The Dollar  and the Policy 
Mix: 1971, from which  I borrow  my own  title,  called  for a policy  of 
fiscal expansion and monetary contraction. I Mundell argued that apply- 
ing this policy mix, which has recently been derided as driving with one 
foot on the gas and one on the brakes, would extract the comparative 
advantage of the two instruments. In Mundell's view,  formalized in his 
famous "assignment problem" for policy instruments, fiscal policy has 
a larger effect  on output than on prices,  while monetary policy  affects 
prices more than output. Therefore, fiscal policy should be "assigned" 
to  the  output  target  and  monetary  policy  to  the  price  level  target.2 
Ostensibly, the policy mix of fiscal expansion and monetary contraction 
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1.  Robert A.  Mundell,  The Dollar and the Policy  Mix: 1971, Essays  in International 
Finance,  85 (Princeton  University,  International Finance  Section,  May  1971). Mundell 
argued on page 24 that "the correct policy mix is based onfiscal ease to get more production 
out of the economy,  in combination with monetary, r-estraint  to stop inflation." (Emphasis 
in original.) 
2.  Ibid., p. 17. To quote Mundell: "Monetary policy has its comparative advantage in 
controlling inflation and the balance of payments, and should be reserved for that purpose. 
Financial  instruments  [that is,  money]  shoulld be  allocated  to financial  targets;  real 
instrulments  [that is, fiscal policy] to real targets. " (Emphasis in original.) 
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can work to raise output and cut prices, or at least slow inflation, at the 
same time. And both sides of the mix, asserted  Mundell, would act to 
strengthen the currency, by raising interest rates and drawing in foreign 
capital. In 1971, it should be remembered,  the dollar was tied to other 
currencies through fixed exchange rates and was under strong downward 
pressure, which forced a devaluation in mid-year. 
One assertion of the 1971 essay that was considered  surprising at the 
time was the notion that fiscal expansion could strengthen the currency. 
The traditional remedy for balance of payments difficulties under fixed 
exchange  rates was  a fiscal contraction,  not an expansion.  Mundell's 
own earlier work, however,  had turned this idea upside down,  at least 
as a short-run proposition.  In his famous  1962 essay,  "The Appropriate 
Use of Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Internal and External Stability," 
Mundell pointed  out that in a world of high capital mobility,  a bond- 
financed fiscal expansion  would raise home  interest rates,  and attract 
more than enough foreign capital at the initial exchange  riate to finance 
the  current  account  deficit  caused  by  the  expansion.3  Under  fixed 
exchange rates the central bank would gain foreign reserves, while under 
flexible rates the currency would appreciate.  In Mundeil's  model,  the 
traditional argument that fiscal expansion  weakens  the currency in the 
short run is correct only if at least one of the following conditions holds: 
there  is  low  international  capital  mobility,  or the fiscal  expansion  is 
money financed, in which case the currency tends to weaken even with 
high capital mobility.  Of course,  Mundell's argument that fiscal expan- 
sion would  strengthen the currency  has become  commonplace  in the 
United States in the policy debate of the past two years. It is still regarded 
as dubious,  however,  by most  European economists  when applied to 
the effects of fiscal expansion in their own economies. 
Mundell's policy advice was not pursued in 1971 or 1972. Instead, the 
Federal  Reserve  Board  embarked  on  one  of  the  most  aggressively 
expansionary policy episodes  in its history. In the event,  the dollar was 
battered,  losing  19 percent  in value  relative  to a basket of currencies 
between July 1971  and March 1973.4 During the past four years, however, 
3.  Robert  A.  Mundell,  "The  Appropriate  Use  of  Monetary  and Fiscal  Policy  for 
Internal and External Stability,"  IMF Staff Papers,  vol. 9 (March 1962), pp. 70-79. 
4.  Throughout  the  paper  the  weighted-average  exchange  rate  is  the  Multilateral 
Exchange Rate Model index of effective  exchange riates, as calculated by the International 
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Mundell's experiment has been tried, probably more vigorously than he 
himself envisioned.  Since  1981, the Reagan administration has pursued 
a course of large budget deficits,  while the Federal Reserve  Board has 
maintained  a  path  of  generally  declining  money  growth  rates.  The 
macroeconomic results have in many ways been in accord with Mundell' s 
analysis: a sharp rise in the dollar, apparently caused by a capital inflow 
attracted to high U.S.  interest  rates; a sharp drop in inflation; and an 
average rate of growth during 1981-84,  composed  of a sharp recession 
in  1982, followed  by a vigorous  recovery.  A major side  effect  of the 
policy mix has been the worsening of the U.S.  trade and current account 
positions,  with both measures of external deficits reaching a proportion 
of GNP unprecedented in this century for the United States. 
This  paper  asks  the  following  question:  has  the  macroeconomic 
performance  since  1981 vindicated  the Mundell-Reagan  mix of fiscal 
expansion  and  monetary  contraction?  And  if  so,  what  then  are the 
implications for the appropriate path of budget deficit reductions  and 
monetary policy in the coming years? The major question to be asked is 
whether the policy mix has reduced the "sacrifice ratio,"  measured as 
the amount of GNP losses  incurred in order to reduce the inflation that 
the Reagan administration inherited in 1981. To answer this question,  I 
will look at the disinflation to date,  as well as the future prospects  for 
inflation, especially  in view of the likelihood of a dollar depreciation. 
My own analysis of the policy  mix will stress the differential effects 
of monetary and fiscal policy  on the value  of the dollar, and thus on 
imported inflation. It is important to note, though, that there are many 
other reasons  why  monetary  and fiscal  policies  might have  different 
effects on inflation and output that would justify  the use of a particular 
policy mix. Mundell, in fact, had additional mechanisms in mind in 1971, 
some in line with the views  of today's  supply-siders.  He suggested that 
tax  cuts  stimulate  output  and reduce  prices  by  increasing  aggregate 
supply relative to aggregate demand. He also argued that money  is, at 
best,  neutral with  respect  to  output  except  in the  very  short run; at 
worst, a money expansion may be contractionary,  Mundell contended, 
because of nonneutralities in the tax system.  Thus the policy mix that I 
will stress is actually based more on Mundell vintage 1962 than Mundell 
vintage  1971.  Other  mechanisms  that  might  argue  in  favor  of  the 
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process  of  disinflation  are  ignored  henceforth.5  The  variety  of  the 
arguments in favor of a particular mix for disinflation stands in contrast 
with the rather simple textbook  case  in which  output levels  and past 
inflation alone determine current inflation. In those models,  any mix of 
monetary and fiscal policy that yields a given output level has the same 
inflationary consequences.  James  Tobin  has  labeled  such  models  as 
"funnel models,"  since the macroeconomic  policies  are funneled into 
output without any direct or differential effects on prices. 
Among  the  questions  examined  in  the  paper,  the  following  bear 
especially  upon the exchange rate: 
-Has  the  strong dollar  contributed  to  the  post-1980  disinflation, 
taking  as  given  the  overall  level  of  GNP  or  unemployment  in  the 
economy,  and if so, by a quantitatively important amount? 
-Can  the policy mix plausibly explain the movements  in the value of 
the currency? 
-Does  the expected large real depreciation of the dollar, which could 
reverse  the appreciation  of the past four years,  threaten to  undo the 
benefits so far achieved by means of a strong dollar? 
-In  view of the expected  depreciation in the value of the dollar, does 
the policy mix viewed  from beginning to "end,"  if and when the dollar 
falls, make sense as an anti-inflationary strategy? 
-Are  such side effects  on the U.S.  economy  of the strong dollar as 
the squeeze  on tradables and the rise in U.S.  foreign indebtedness  too 
costly to justify the choice of policy mix? 
-Are  U.S.  gains from the policy  mix balanced by losses  in the rest 
of the world, so that the policies are in fact beggar-thy-neighbor? 
Questions  about  the  longer  term  aspects  of  the  policy  mix  are 
especially  important in view of the fact that Mundell's arguments were 
based on short-run models that do not make allowance for the long-term 
effects  of current account  deficits and budget deficits.  Notably,  Mun- 
dell's canonical model of fiscal expansion under flexible rates allows for 
an "equilibrium" in which a country has an appreciated exchange  rate 
and a current account deficit forever.  More recent models have shown 
5.  For  example,  even  in  a  closed  economy,  the  high  interest  rate  effects  of  the 
Mundellian mix could cause primary commodity prices to fall if inventories are de-stocked 
in response to the interest rates. Such a decline in inventories would provide a temporary, 
favorable "supply shock"  to the economy,  which could feed through to lower prices and 
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that  when  the  short-run effects  of  fiscal  policy  include  a  currency 
appreciation, the long-term effects  typically involve  depreciation.6 The 
weaker long-run value of the currency helps to generate a trade account 
surplus  that  is  used,  in  the  long  run,  to  service  the  external  debt 
accuraulated  in the  period  of  currency  appreciation.  Given  that the 
benefits of the strong dollar may be lost over time, does the Mundellian 
strategy make sense when viewed over a reasonably long time horizon? 
To be clear about purposes,  one  disclaimer  should be made at the 
outset. Though I will analyze the current U.S.  policy mix from the point 
of view of dynamic policy  optimization,  I do not want to pretend that 
the mix has been designed  primarily, or at all, with the exchange  rate 
arguments in mind. Indeed, the notion of inexpensive disinflation through 
currency appreciation was rarely, if ever, explicitly  stated in 1981 as an 
argument on behalf of the Reagan tax cuts,  though more recently  the 
president  has explicitly  defended  the strong dollar on these  grounds. 
Supply-side  advocates  often  rejected  the demand-stimulus  arguments 
that underlie many of my findings. My own view of the "design"  of the 
policy mix is more Darwinian. Tax cut advocates  did explicitly endorse 
the argument that a debt-financed fiscal expansion need not be inflation- 
ary, but they probably did not anticipate the enormous currency appre- 
ciation,  and its anti-inflationary benefits,  that would  follow  from the 
policy. However,  once the noninflationary recovery got under way, the 
short-term success  of the policy  mix became evident,  and the pressure 
to expand money or to contract the budget deficits was eliminated. Even 
if the policymakers  fell onto a desirable path accidentally,  the staying 
power of the strategy has resulted from the short-term, if not long-term, 
benefits that it is yielding. 
The main finding of the paper is that the Mundell policy mix reduces 
the sacrifice ratio in the short run, but increases it in the long run. In the 
United States, the exchange appreciation has reduced inflation by 2 to 3 
percentage points as of 1984. Given the strong likelihood of a depreciation 
of the dollar, those 2 to 3 points, and even more, will likely be lost in the 
future. Because of the foreign debt that the U.S.  economy  will accumu- 
late in coming years,  the eventual  decline  of the dollar, in real terms, 
6.  See, for example,  Rudiger Dornbusch and Stanley Fischer,  "Exchange  Rates and 
the Current Account,"  American Economic  Reiviewi,  vol.  70 (December  1980), pp. 960- 
71; Jeffrey Sachs and Charles Wyplosz,  "Real Exchange  Rate Effects of Fiscal Policy," 
Working Paper 1255 (National Bureau of Economic  Research, January 1984). 122  Brookings Paper-s on Economic Activity, 1:1985 
will likely  exceed  the appreciation  since  1980. As  I discuss  later, the 
welfare calculus suggests that choosing a low sacrifice ratio in the short 
term for a higher long-run sacrifice ratio makes  sense  when there is a 
perceived  need  for a rapid reduction  of a high initial inflation, which 
tends  to be the case  when  inflation has rapidly rising marginal social 
costs. 
The paper has four sections.  The first examines  the pattern of dollar 
appreciation  and makes  some  estimates  of  its  disinflationary  conse- 
quences. The second section looks at the prospects for future movements 
in the dollar and projects future inflationary consequences  from dollar 
depreciation. In the third section,  I use a medium-scale structural model 
to assess  the linkages between  movements  of the dollar and the under- 
lying policy mix. I also examine the arguments for and against the Mun- 
dellian strategy from the point of view of dynamic policy optimization, 
first from the narrow U.S.  point of view, and then from that of the world 
economy  as a whole.  The fourth section  examines  some of the risks in 
the current situation, particularly a sharp depreciation of the dollar. 
The Value of the Dollar and the Disinflation  Process 
Figure 1 and table 1 document the remarkable movements in the value 
of the dollar over  the past eight years,  using,  as does  the rest of the 
paper,  the  following  conventions  for  exchange  rates.  The  dollar  is 
measured  in terms of the  number of units of foreign currency  that it 
purchases; a rise in the index therefore indicates appreciation.  "Effec- 
tive"  rates  indicate  dollar  values  relative  to  a basket  of  currencies. 
"Real"  exchange  rates  are nominal rates  multiplied by  a U.S.  price 
index and divided by a comparable  effective  foreign price index.  The 
real exchange rate may be thought of as the price of U.S.  goods relative 
to foreign goods,  with both expressed  in a common currency. A rise in 
U.S.  relative prices is termed a real appreciation of the dollar. As can be 
seen  in both figure 1 and table  1, the nominal effective  exchange  rate 
appreciated by about 34 percent from 1976:4  to 1984:4, and by 50 percent 
from 1980:4 to 1984:4, using the International Monetary Fund's Multi- 
lateral Exchange  Rate Model (MERM) to provide a weighted effective 
exchange  rate for the U.S.  dollar. The last quarter of  1980 will be the 
starting point for most of the analysis, since it marks the coming to power Jeffrey D. Sachs  123 
Figure 1.  The Effective Dollar Exchange Rate,  1976:4-1984:3a 
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Source:  International Monetary Fund,  internzationatil  Finiatncial  Statistics,  series  amx and 63ey  110. 
a.  Effective  nominal rate is the IMF Multilateral Exchange  Rate Model index;  real rate is the relative  wholesale 
price index for manufacturing. 
of the Reagan administration and the beginning of the Mundellian policy 
shift. In real terms,  the appreciation  has been  equally  dramatic, with 
increases during 1980:4-1984:3  of about 38 percent when measured by 
wholesale prices, 48 percent when measured by relative unit labor costs, 
and 39 percent  when  measured  by  relative  consumer  price  indexes. 
Table  1 also  shows  the  changes  in  the  dollar  relative  to  the  major 
currencies. Note its sharp real appreciation relative to European curren- 
cies and the smaller appreciation relative to the Japanese yen.  In fact, 
the yen  itself has appreciated  relative  to a basket  of currencies  since 
1980:4, a point that is sometimes  ignored in assertions that the Japanese 
authorities have unfairly caused a yen depreciation. 
The upward movement  in the  dollar began  almost  precisely  upon 
Reagan's election victory in November  1980. Later, I will argue that the 
fiscal expansion since  1981 (anticipated after November  1980) has been 
a major factor in the currency appreciation.  As documented  by Olivier 
J. Blanchard and Lawrence  H.  Summers,  the fiscal expansion  in the 
United  States  has  been  accompanied  by  a  fiscal  contraction  in  the 
economies of other Organization for Economic  Cooperation and Devel- 124  Brookin  s Paners on Economic Activity. 1:1985 
Table 1.  Appreciation of the U.S.  Dollar: 1976:4-1984:4a 
Percent 
Appreciation  to 1984:4 
Nominal  Real 
From  From  From  From 
Country or aggregate  1976:4  1980:4  1976:4  1980:4 
Effective  multilateral exchange  rate  34.4  50.0  28.8  37.8b 
Bilateral exchange  rate 
Canada  32.9  11.4  16.0  1.5 
France  87.8  111.8  50.0  51.8 
Germany  26.8  59.7  51.3  50.2 
Italy  119.1  108.6  32.9b  42.9b 
Japan  -  16.2  16.8  12.6  29.3 
United  Kingdom  35.8  96.2  3.8b  58.5b 
Source:  All data are from International Monetary  Fund, ltiternationatil  Financial  Statistics.  various issues. 
a.  Data  are  quarterly averages.  The  effective  multilateral  nominal  rate  is  the  MERM  index  (series  amx).  The 
effective  multilateral real rate is the IMF measure of relative wholesale  prices for manufacturing, which are adjusted 
by  nominal exchange  rates (series  63ey).  The real bilateral rate is PEIP*,  where  P,  P* are wholesale  prices  (series 
63)  in the  United  States  and abroad,  and E  is  the  nominal  bilateral rate (series  rf) expressed  as  units of  foreign 
currency  per U.S.  dollar. 
b.  Appreciation to  1984:3. 
opment (OECD) countries.7 In the period since 1980:4, the United States 
and the other six large OECD economies  have had a major success  in 
reducing inflation, but only the United States has reduced inflation and 
achieved a vigorous recovery from the 1982 recession.  In the European 
countries, the inflation reduction has been accompanied by a protracted 
and serious rise in unemployment. The evidence  suggests that the extent 
of recovery,  or the change in unemployment since 1982, has been related 
to the extent  of fiscal expansion.  Of course,  other factors,  such as the 
flexibility in labor market adjustment, have also probably played a role 
in the differential employment adjustment during the 1980s. 
Without question,  a significant part of the U.S.  disinflation can be 
attributed to the sharp recession  from  1981:3 to  1982:4. According  to 
Robert J. Gordon's estimates  in 1984, the cumulative GNP gap (output 
loss relative to potential) during the recession  was 9.9 percent of GNP.8 
Since the end of the recession,  the economy  has remained significantly 
below  potential,  with  another  10.5 percent  of  cumulative  GNP  gap 
7.  Olivier J. Blanchard and Lawrence  H.  Summers,  "Perspectives  on High World 
Real Interest Rates,"  BPEA, 2:1984, pp. 273-324. 
8.  Robert J. Gordon,  "Unemployment  and Potential  Output in the  1980s,"  BPEA, 
2:1984, pp. 537-64. Jeffrey D. Sachs  125 
between  1982:3 and  1984:4. These  estimates  make  possible  a rough 
measure  of  the  sacrifice  ratio in the recent  disinflation.  The  inflation 
measure  is  the  change  in  the  personal  consumption  deflator  of  the 
national income  accounts.  The  pre-Reagan  inflation rate is the  quar- 
terly change  in  1980:4 at an annual rate,  or 9.6  percent.  The current 
inflation  rate  is  the  quarterly  rate  for  1984:4,  or  2.4  percent.  The 
cumulative gap is taken from Gordon's estimates of potential GNP, and 
is measured  from  1981:1 to  1984:4 to be 21.5 percent  of output.  The 
sacrifice ratio is the cumulative gap divided by the slowdown in inflation, 
or 21.5/(9.6  -  2.4),  which equals 3.0.  A similar measure results if the 
slowdown in inflation is calculated using the inflation rates of the entire 
years  1980 (10.2  percent)  and  1984 (3.2  percent),  and the  same  21.5 
percent cumulative output loss. 
How does  a sacrifice ratio of 3.0 compare with estimates  that were 
made before and during the disinflation of the past four years? As Stanley 
Fischer has recently summarized, estimates  of the ratio were surveyed 
by Arthur M. Okun in 1978 and were found to be in the range of 6 to 18.9 
Okun himself put the best guess  at  10. On this basis,  the outcome  to 
date has been  significantly better than was  forecast.  This conclusion 
holds up if the slowdown  is measured using a "core"  rate of inflation, 
rather than actual inflation. The change in average hourly earnings in 
nonfarm business  (comparing 1984:4 with 1980:4), for example,  results 
in an even larger slowdown  in inflation, and therefore a lower sacrifice 
ratio of 2.9. 
One reason why the sacrifice ratio, using the GNP gap, has been lower 
than forecast is that the relationship between the GNP gap and aggregate 
unemployment has apparently shifted since 1980 (that is, the coefficient 
in Okun's law has changed). The cumulative  "excess"  unemployment 
since 1980:4 (using 6 percent as the full-employment level) has been 10.8 
percent, which is more than pre-1980 Okun's law equations would have 
associated  with  the  21.5  percent  output  gap during the  period  since 
1980:4.10  An unemployment-based  sacrifice ratio therefore  yields  1.7, 
which is below  but close  to the band of 2 to 6 that Okun surveyed  in 
9.  See  Stanley  Fischer,  "Real  Balances,  the Exchange  Rate,  and Indexation:  Real 
Variables in Disinflation, " Discussion Paper 1497  (National Bureau of Economic Research, 
November  1984.) 
10. Okun used  a multiplier of 3 to get  the GNP  gap from the unemployment  rate. 
Gordon's equation yields a multiplier of about 2. 126  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1985 
1978. Thus, on one measure-the  output gap-the  disinflation has been 
much more rapid than was considered plausible in 1978, while on another 
measure-the  unemployment  rate-the  sacrifice  ratio  has  been  just 
below the low end of the suggested range. 
There are of course  a number of possible  reasons  for the favorable 
disinflation of the past four years. Rational expectations  theory stresses 
that sacrifice ratios may not be stable,  and indeed may depend on the 
policy  regime.  Perhaps  Paul  Volcker's  nonaccommodative  policies 
generated a newly found credibility for the Federal Reserve,  along the 
lines urged by Phillip Cagan and William Fellner.II In George Perry's 
terms, the wage norm may have shifted in a favorable direction because 
of Reagan's resolve  in firing Professional Air Traffic Controllers' Orga- 
nization (PATCO) workers, or his apparent willingness to countenance 
a deep recession  in 1982, or other reasons.12  I believe,  however,  that 
much of the reason is more prosaic,  and not so optimistic for the long 
run.  Specifically,  the  strong  dollar  has  played  a  major role  in  the 
disinflation process.  Gordon  and  Stephen  King  showed  in  1982 that 
allowing  for  such  international  influences  as  exchange  rate  effects, 
foreign price effects,  and food and oil prices on the U.S.  price dynamics 
reduces the estimated  sacrifice ratio for the GNP gap from about 8.4 to 
3, equal to the recent experience.  13 In the vector autoregressions  in that 
study, Gordon and King estimated the exchange rate appreciation effects 
to be the natural consequence  of tight monetary policies,  and thereby 
foresaw the relatively low cost to the recent disinflation. Their estimates 
do not, however,  very accurately  capture the long-run depreciation of 
the dollar that may now ensue. Thus, while their estimates were accurate 
for the short term, they may prove too optimistic over the longer run, as 
discussed  later. 
How plausible is it to assume that the strong dollar has played a major 
role in the disinflation process? What is the best guess of its quantitative 
significance to date? To answer these questions,  I consider three types 
of evidence:  first, the existing range of estimates regarding the effects of 
11.  Phillip Cagan and William Fellner,  "Tentative  Lessons  from the Recent Disinfla- 
tionary Effort," BPEA, 2:1983, pp. 603-10. 
12.  See the wage norm concept in George L. Perry, "Inflation in Theory and Practice," 
BPEA, 1:1980, pp. 207-41. 
13.  Robert  J.  Gordon  and  Stephen  R.  King,  "The  Output Cost  of  Disinflation  in 
Traditional and Vector Autoregressive  Models,"  BPEA, 1:1982, pp. 205-42. Jeffrey D. Sachs  127 
exchange  rate changes  on prices;  second,  estimates  of the  structural 
channels  through which  the  exchange  rate can  influence  prices;  and 
third, a simulation model of the world economy,  with a major block for 
the  United  States  in  which  the  general  equilibrium  effects  of  U.S. 
exchange rate changes can be considered. 
EXCHANGE  RATES  AND  INFLATION  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 
In a useful paper written in 1979, Peter Hooper and Barbara Lowrey 
surveyed  the literature on the effects  of a dollar depreciation  on U.S. 
prices. 14 In most of the studies that they examine, a small model of wage 
and price dynamics is estimated, with wage and price inflation a function 
of output or unemployment,  lagged inflation, changes  in the exchange 
rate, and foreign prices.  In some of the models,  the dollar price of oil is 
held fixed when the depreciation is simulated, while in others, the dollar 
price  of  oil  is  modeled  endogenously,  and  is  therefore  affected  by 
exchange rate changes. In most cases,  the studies investigate how wages 
and prices are affected  by an exogenous  change  in the exchange  rate, 
taking as  given  the  path  of  output  and the  local  currency  prices  of 
manufacturing imports, for example,  the deutsche  mark price of West 
German exports,  the yen price of Japanese exports.  The framework is a 
useful  one  for this paper,  since  we  will  want  to  see  how  inflation is 
affected by a change in policy mix that alters the exchange  rate but not 
output. By taking as given  the local currency prices  in the rest of the 
OECD,  however,  the framework  ignores  the  linkages  from the  U.S. 
exchange rate to local currency prices abroad and back to U.S.  import 
prices. These  linkages can be accounted  for only in a global model,  as 
presented  later.  In the partial equilibrium exercises  that Hooper  and 
Lowrey analyze, it is also crucial to assume that whatever are the shocks 
altering the exchange rate, whether portfolio shifts or a change in mix of 
fiscal and monetary policy,  these shocks have no direct effect on prices 
except as they work through output or the exchange rate itself. 
Hooper and Lowrey reach the following conclusion: 
The consensus estimate we propose ...  is that a given 10 percent real dollar 
depreciation,  on a multilaterally  weighted average basis, will result in a  11/2 
14.  See Peter Hooper and Barbara Lowrey,  "Impact of the Dollar Depreciation on the 
U.S.  Price Level: An Analytical Survey of Empirical Estimates,"  Staff Study 103 (Board 
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percent  increase  in  consumer  price  level, assuming  an  intermediate  policy  stance 
[fixed  GNP target]  if oil import  prices are not affected  by the depreciation;  and 
it will  result  in  a  13/4  percent  increase  if oil  import prices  rise  by  the  same 
proportion as nonoil prices in response to the depreciation. Given the time frame 
of the various models considered,  about half of the total impact is likely to take 
place within one year of the depreciation and the remainder within two to three 
years, although the timing of the oil price effects  may be more variable because 
of the discontinuity of OPEC pricing decisions.'5 
In some  of  the  studies,  the  price  level  effect  of aboLut 12 percent  in fact 
represents  the  two-  or three-year  effect,  with  greater  effects  present  if a 
longer  time  interval  is  examined.  This  is  true  when  the  level  change  in 
the exchange  rate gets  built  into  a persistent  change  in the inflation  rate. 
Note  that  persistent,  even  permanent,  effects  on  inflation  are  logically 
possible  after  a one-time  level  depreciation,  since  the  policy  authorities 
are assumed  to be holding  real GNP  fixed,  and are therefore  assumed  in 
the experiment  to be fully  accommodating  any  increases  in the domestic 
price  level. 
The  estimates  then  are  that  the  inflation  rate  is  about  0.8  or  0.9 
percentage  point  higher  in each  of the  first two  years  after  a  10 percent 
depreciation  (and  equivalently,  about  0.8  or 0.9  percentage  point  lower 
in  each  year  after  a  10 percent  appreciation),  and  perhaps  somewhat 
higher  in later  years  as well.  For  purposes  of illustration,  let  us  assume 
that the inflation  rate is 0.3 percentage  point  higher  in the third year,  and 
zero  thereafter.  Given  the  Hooper-Lowrey  estimate  of  13  points  on  the 
consumer  price  index  (CPI),  divided  evenly  in the first two  years,  with  a 
third-year  effect  of  0.3  point  added  on,  how  important  has  the  strong 
dollar  been  for inflation  in the period  since  1980, taking  the path of output 
as  given?  Using  the  same  data  as  in  figure  1,  the  effective  nominal 
exchange  rate appreciated  12.7 percent  in 1981,  11.7 percent  in 1982, 5.8 
percent in 1983, and 7.9 percent in 1984. Applying the Hooper-Lowrey 
consensus,  with  the  assumed  third-year effect  we  find the  following 
estimates  of  inflation  (change  in  personal  consumption  deflator,  in 
percentage points) with and without the appreciation since 1980: 
1981  1982  1983  1984 
Actual  inflation  8.7  5.9  3.7  3.2 
Exchange  rate  effect  1.1  2.1  1.9  1.6 
Inflation  with fixed 
exchange  rate since 1980  9.8  8.0  5.6  4.8 
15.  Ibid., pp. 51-52. Jeffrey D. Sachs  129 
Thus, a substantial effect of the exchange rate is indicated, though by no 
means has the appreciation been the decisive  factor, according to these 
estimates. My own estimates, later on, will show a larger effect, basically 
because I find the effect on inflation more persistent than implied here. 
Several  more recent  estimates  also  imply a significant role for the 
exchange rate in the recent disinflation. In their 1982 study, Gordon and 
King consider the costs of disinflation under two alternative assumptions. 
One is that the tight monetary policy underlying the disinflation causes 
the dollar to appreciate, and thereby causes  import prices and food and 
fuel prices to fall relative to baseline. The other is that the exchange rate, 
import prices,  and food  and fuel prices  are unchanged by the path of 
disinflation.16  In the first case,  the authors estimate  a sacrifice ratio of 
3.0,  that  is,  a  3 percent  loss  in  output  for  each  1 percentage  point 
reduction  in  inflation.  In  the  case  where  the  foreign  variables  are 
exogenous,  the sacrifice ratio rises to 8.4. Dornbusch and Fischer have 
recently offered some estimates  of the role of the exchange  rate appre- 
ciation since 1980.17  Their study is novel in allowing for a direct effect of 
exchange rate movements  on wage settlements,  above and beyond any 
indirect effects  via consumer  prices or output. The argument is that a 
strong dollar raises domestic  labor costs  relative to foreign labor costs, 
and thereby increases  the pressure  on domestic  firms in the tradables 
sector to limit costs.  Since this effect is presumed to hold at a given level 
of total output or employment,  Dornbusch  and Fischer  appear to be 
arguing that the combination  of a weak tradables  sector  and a strong 
nontradables sector is less inflationary than the reverse situation. They 
estimate that a 10 percent depreciation of the dollar, at given aggregate 
output levels,  causes  a 2.1 percentage  point increase  in prices  over  a 
two-year  period.  These  estimates  are higher than those  reported  by 
Hooper and Lowrey,  perhaps because  of the wage effect,  though they 
might have been higher still, since Dornbusch and Fischer do not allow 
for any effect of exchange  rate changes on the rate of change of oil and 
gas prices. 
Finally,  there  are estimates  from large-scale  econometric  models, 
such  as  the  OECD  interlink model  or  the  Federal  Reserve  Board's 
16. Gordon and King, "The Output Cost of Disinflation." 
17. Rudiger Dornbusch and Stanley Fischer,  "The Open Economy:  Implications for 
Monetary  and  Fiscal  Policy,"  Working  Paper  1422 (National  Bureau  of  Economic 
Research, August 1984). 130  Brookings Papers oni  Economic Activity, 1:1985 
Multicountry  Model  (MCM).  Recent  simulations  on  the  MCM yield 
much smaller estimates of the effects of the exchange rate appreciation. 18 
Note  that the numbers shown below  are for fourth quarter over fourth 
quarter CPI inflation rates (in percentage points): 
1981  1982  1983 
Exchange  rate  effect  0.6  1.1  1.2 
EXCHANGE  RATE  EFFECTS  ON  INFLATION 
I now turn to my own  structural estimates  of the role of the dollar 
appreciation.  There  are several  possible  channels  through which  ex- 
change  rate changes  may affect  domestic  wage  and price  formation. 
Most  simply,  at unchanged  foreign  currency  costs  of production,  an 
exchange  rate  change  should  affect  the  domestic  currency  price  of 
foreign  imports.  I term this  the  "direct"  effect.  In turn,  changes  in 
foreign import prices will affect consumer prices directly if the imports 
are consumergoods,  orindirectly if the imports are inputs into production 
of consumer goods. As many analysts have noted, however,  a change in 
exchange rates for given levels of foreign wages and prices may be used 
by foreign producers  to expand profit margins on sales  to the United 
States (in which case import prices in dollars do not change), instead of 
to cut prices in dollar terms (which preserves an unchanged markup over 
foreign costs).  In general, a change in the exchange rate appears to cause 
a less  than proportional change  in import prices  in the  short run, as 
foreign producers react to the exchange  rate change both by lowering 
prices and by expanding their markup over local currency costs. 
A second possible effect comes as domestic producers react to lower 
import prices  by cutting their own prices  and profit margins. Even  at 
unchanged domestic  costs,  domestic  producers may cut prices and be 
forced,  by reduced profit margins, to withdraw output supply, in view 
of lower competitors'  prices.  If this effect  is important, the size of the 
exchange  rate effect on consumer prices will be given not by the direct 
weight  of  imports in the price  index,  but by  the weight  of all highly 
tradable goods,  including imports, exports, and import-competing home 
goods,  in the price index. I term this the "competitiveness"  effect. 
18.  Peter Hooper,  "The Macroeconomic  Effects  of Exchange  Rate Changes: Some 
Quantitative Estimates"  (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,  April 1984), 
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There are at least two areas where the competitiveness  effect surely 
applies. The impact of changes in world oil prices on the CPI is far higher 
than is indicated by the share of oil imports in consumption expenditure, 
since  domestic  producers  must  adjust their prices  to  shifts  in world 
prices.  As  the  United  States  produces  roughly  half of  its  petroleum 
consumption,  the impact of changes in the world price of oil on the CPI 
might be roughly twice as large as the import share. A second area where 
the effect  applies  is in food.  The CPI weight  of food  is of course  far 
higher than the import component  alone,  since the United  States pro- 
duces the great bulk of its food consumption.  Since world market prices 
have an important effect on domestic food prices, a given exchange rate 
change might show up in consumer prices with a far larger impact than 
the direct import share of food would predict. I stress below,  moreover, 
that even though oil and many foods in international trade are priced in 
dollars, exchange  rate changes  should still be expected  to have a large 
effect on dollar prices of those commodities.  Where the competitiveness 
effect is harder to observe is in the area of rmlanufactured  goods. Wing T. 
Woo has recently argued that for manufactured goods,  competitiveness 
effects are small, if not negligible. 19  Others too have found small, though 
significant, competitiveness  effects for U.S.  manufacturing.20 
The "direct" and "competitiveness"  effects will have a large impact 
on inflation only if changes  in the CPI subsequently  get built into wage 
dynamics.  Merchandise imports are only about 9 percent of GNP,  and 
are probably about the same direct share in the CPI, including the pass- 
through of imported intermediate product prices into final output. Even 
increasing  this  weight  through competitive  effects  in food,  fuel,  and 
other goods to give a 15 percent weight to foreign prices in the CPI (a 
little larger than the estimate  below),  a 40 percent appreciation of the 
dollar would not have overwhelming inflation consequences,  especially 
when  spread  out  over  several  years.  Suppose  that  each  1 percent 
appreciation results  in a 0.75 percent  drop in import prices,  as in our 
estimates below.  Then a 40 percent appreciation,  spread out over four 
years,  causes  import price inflation to be about 7.5 percentage  points 
(40/4  x  0.75) higher per year. With a CPI weight of 0.15,  the inflation 
19. Wing T. Woo,  'Exchange  Rates and the Prices of Nonfood,  Nonfuel Products," 
BPEA, 2:1984, pp. 511-30. 
20.  See  Dean  A.  DeRosa  and  Morris  Goldstein,  "Import  Discipline  in  the  U.S. 
Manufacturing Sector"  IMF Staff Papers,  vol. 28 (September  1981), pp. 600-34. 132  Brookings Pavers on Economic Activity. 1:1985 
effect of the appreciation would be about 1.  1 percentage points per year. 
Since the overall reduction in inflation was about 7 percentage points by 
1984, the exchange rate role would not have been large. 
However,  if the changes  in the CPI get built into wage inflation, we 
can  dramatically  increase  the  inflation  effect  imputed  to  the  dollar 
appreciation. Suppose, for example, that wage inflation Tr"'  =  wt -  w,  ,, 
with w, the logarithm of wages,  is a function of lagged consumer price 
inflation and lagged output gap: 
(1)  =  t  + (QW,- 
where -rTc  = p-c  p,c  1, and pc is the (log) CPI. Suppose  also that pc is a 
weighted average of wages and import prices, pntn 
(2)  c=  w, +  (1 -  X)pn. 
(The term 1 -  X might reasonably  be expected  to be between  0.1 and 
0.15.) Combining equation 1 and equation 2, we have: 
(3)  rrc  =  vrr{c +  X4,Q,_I +  (1 -  \)rr,n 
where -rn17  is the rate of import price inflation. 
Consider a baseline path for -rrc,  and ask how the path will change for 
a one-shot  rise  in import price  inflation at t  =  0,  denoted  A-1To71.  We 
examine the path holding fixed the baseline for output Qt. If Azr,c  is the 
change in inflation relative to the baseline path, we can easily  see from 
equation 3 that: 
(4)  (1  -  X)XtAMTm 
In every subsequent period, inflation is higher, by an amount that decays 
geometrically.  Note  that the total price level effect of the shock A&rro7  is 
given  by  17o=o/Tr,c  which  simply  equals  zATr, upon  substitution  of 
equation 4. In other words, a 10 percent fall in import prices eventually 
causes  a 10 percent fall in domestic  prices,  even if the direct weight of 
pfl  inpc is small,  assuming  that  macroeconomic  policy offsets any  effects 
on output. The feedback  from p"l to pc to w, and back to pc,  multiplies 
the direct effect of import prices severalfold. 
In this way, a 40 percent appreciation can plausibly have had a very 
large effect on U.S.  inflation even though the economy  has a relatively 
small import share. Assuming that each  1 percent appreciation leads to 
a drop in import prices  of 0.75  percent  within the  year,  and that the Jeffrey D. Sachs  133 
weight of tradables in the CPI is 0.15,  the simple model just  outlined 
delivers the following estimates of the exchange rate effect on consumer 
prices since 1980  (in percentage points), using the annual rate of exchange 
rate appreciation mentioned earlier:21 
1981  1982  1983  1984 
Exchange  rate  effect  1.4  2.5  2.8  3.3 
In this case,  more than 3 percentage points of the inflation reduction 
since 1980 can be attributed to the rise in the dollar. The main difference 
between  this estimate  and the Hooper-Lowrey  based  estimate  that I 
derived earlier is the third- and fourth-year effects  of the exchange  rate 
change on inflation. (Note  that the effect  in the first two years here is 
slightly higher.) Earlier, I assumed  a 0.3 percentage point effect  in the 
third year following  a  10 percent  appreciation; here,  the effect  is 0.7. 
And the fourth-year effect is 0.6. 
As a preliminary step toward a structural model, it is useful to examine 
the composition  of imports and consumption  in the U.S.  economy.  The 
breakdown of imports by their end use is shown in table 2. Merchandise 
imports in 1984 accounted  for 8.9 percent of GNP.  Almost one-fifth of 
U.S.  imports by value were oil imports,  and another  18 percent  were 
other primary or intermediate inputs to industry. Food imports were 6.5 
percent  of  the  total.  The  remaining  imports  were  finished  goods  of 
various  sorts.  Taken together,  imported inputs (food,  fuel,  and other 
industrial supplies) accounted  for 44 percent of total imports. Eighteen 
percent of imports was nonautomobile  capital equipment for industry, 
leaving only  18 percent  of imports as nonauto consumer  items.  Auto- 
mobile imports accounted  for  17 percent of the total.  Of course,  auto 
imports should in principle be divided between consumer purchases and 
business purchases. 
These data are illuminating for several reasons. First, the direct effect 
of lower prices on imported consumer items, other than food, fuel, and 
autos,  is bound to be small.  Such imports were a mere 2.6 percent of 
total  personal  consumption  expenditure  in  1984.  And  any  potential 
sizable reductions in auto prices during 1981-84 were probably prevented 
21.  The percentage  exchange  rate changes  are  12.7,  11.7, 5.8,  and 7.9  in the years 
1981-84. The assumed  import price changes  are given  by 0.75 times  the exchange  rate 
changes. Then equation 4 is applied, noting for example, that the effect on the 1983  inflation 
rate will be the sum of the import price effects of 1981, 1982, and 1983. 134  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1  985 
Table 2.  Composition of U.S.  Merchandise Imports, 1984 
Percent  of  Percenit of 
Category  total imports  GNP 
Primary and intermediate 
Food,  feeds,  beverages  6.5  0.6 
Fuels  19.1  1.7 
Nonfood,  nonfuel industrial 
supplies  18.4  1.6 
Finished 
Capital goods  (less  auto)  18.4  1.6 
Consumption  goods  (less  auto)  18.4  1.6 
Automobiles,  parts  16.9  1.5 
Not  elsewhere  classified  2.4  0.2 
Total  100.0  8.9 
Source:  Based  on imports by end-use  category,  U.S.  Bureau of Economic  Analysis,  Surv'ey of Currenit  Businiess, 
vol.  65 (March  1985), pp. 6, 44. 
by the voluntary  export  restraints on Japanese  autos,  as I document 
below. 
Thus,  to the extent  that there are sizable  "direct"  effects  of lower 
import prices on consumption prices, these will show up to a significant 
extent as reduced costs  of industrial inputs and as lower food and fuel 
prices.  Contrary to simple models of international trade that emphasize 
only trade in final consumption  goods,  U.S.  trade is heavily  skewed to 
primary and intermediate commodities,  or to capital goods.  Indeed, 62 
percent of imports were in these categories  in 1984, and no less than 67 
percent  on average  during 1980-84.  (Changes  in capital goods  prices 
should  not  be  expected  to  have  any  significant  effects  on  short-run 
pricing. There will be a long-run effect,  of course,  as changes in capital 
goods  prices  alter investment  expenditures  and thereby  change  unit 
variable  costs  in  the  future.)  The  low  share  of  significant  nonfood, 
nonfuel consumer imports probably accounts for much of Woo's finding 
of small effects on consumer prices of nonfood,  nonoil import prices.22 
There is little doubt that the exchange  rate appreciation has affected 
the prices of all categories of imports, except  where trade barriers have 
substantially  insulated  the domestic  market from world price effects. 
The price changes  for a subset of the end-use  categories  are shown in 
22.  Woo, "Exchange  Rates." Jeffrey D. Sachs  135 
Table 3.  Price Changes in the United States during Appreciation and Depreciation of the 
U.S.  Dollar, Selected Periods, 1976:4-1984:3 
Annual rates of change,  in percent 
Period  of  Period  of 
depreciation  appreciation 
Item  1976:4-1980:4  1980:4-1984:3 
Effective  multilateral exchange  rate  -2.7  10.6 
Overall import price deflator  11.6  -  3.0 
Consumption deflator  8.4  4.9 
Food  imports  12.1  -  3.0 
Fuel imports  27.4  -  3.7 
Imports of nonfood,  nonfuel 
industrial supplies  13.0  -  2.8 
Consumer goods 
Importsa  7.8  -  0.2 
CPIb  9.6  3.9 
Autos 
Imports  n.a.  3.8 
CPI  7.2  3.3 
Apparel 
Imports  6.lc  3.4 
CPI  3.8c  2.0 
Furniture 
Imports  n.a.  -  1.8 
CPI  6.3  3.7 
Appliances 
Imports  4.8  -  4.6 
CPI  4.8  3.4 
Sources:  Effective  multilateral exchange  rate: MERM index from IMF, Ipiternzational  Finiancial Statistics,  variouLs 
issues;  overall import and consumption  deflator: implicit price deflator from national income  and product accounts; 
food, fuel, and nonfood,  nonfuel industrial supplies: implicit price import deflator from national income and product 
accounts;  imports  of  overall  consumer  goods  excluding  autos:  implicit  price  deflator  from  national  income  and 
product accounts;  overall  consumer  goods,  CPI,  U.S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics;  all data for detailed  consumer 
goods category are from BLS,  defined as follows:  imports of autos: import price index,  SITC 781; autos, CPI; urban, 
category  45; imports of  apparel: import price  index,  SITC 84; apparel,  CPI: urban, category  83200 (both exclude 
footwear); imports of furniture: import price index, SITC 82; furniture, CPI: urban, category 29; imports of appliances: 
import price index SITC 775; appliances,  CPI: wage earners, category  30. 
n.a.  Not available. 
a.  Not  including autos. 
b.  Commodities only. 
c.  1977:3-1980:4. 
table  3,  for  the  period  of  dollar  appreciation  (1980:4-1984:3)  and  a 
preceding  period  of  dollar  depreciation  (1976:4-1980:4).  During  the 
period of depreciation the prices of import items rose much more rapidly 
than did domestic  prices,  as  fneasured by  the  consumption  deflator, 
while the opposite  is  true after  1980:4. Two  categories  of  consumer 
goods were subject to extensive  trade restrictions during the early 1980s: 
textiles,  which were governed by the multifiber agreement,  and autos, 136  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1985 
which were governed  by the voluntary export  restraints on Japanese 
autos. It is noteworthy  that those two categories  of imports show little 
difference  in pricing compared with domestic  goods,  while imports of 
unprotected  consumer  items,  such  as  furniture and  appliances,  had 
price increases far below the overall price increases for those categories 
in the CPI. 
Nearly  half of consumption  expenditure  is on  services  rather than 
commodities.  Since the services  have a high input of nontraded goods 
(particularly for housing  services,  which are about 30 percent of total 
consumption  expenditure,  and about 60 percent  of total  services  ex- 
penditure),  we  should  expect  a  significant exchange  rate effect  only 
within about half of the consumption basket.23  It is notable, indeed, that 
inflation  in  services  significantly  outpaced  inflation  in  commodities 
during 1980:4-1984:4, by 6.9 percent per year compared with 3.9 percent 
per year.  Fuel prices,  among the commodities,  increased  particularly 
slowly  during  1980:4-1984:4.  Consumer  food  prices  increased  less 
rapidly  than  average  consumer  prices,  but  surprisingly  rapidly  (3.6 
percent on average) in the period, in view of the sharp drop in U.S.  food 
import prices and, as we shall see, world prices of primary food products. 
Part of the discrepancy results from the considerable processing of food 
that takes place between  the farm and consumer level.  As an example, 
part of the CPI food  index  includes  "food  away  from home,"  which 
includes a large service component.  As would be expected,  "food away 
from home"  increased  in price much more rapidly (5.2 percent) than 
"food at home"  (2.9 percent). 
Among commodities,  about half of expenditures are accounted for by 
food, beverages, and energy alone. Indeed, food and energy expenditures 
account  for about 30 percent of the total consumption  basket.  (About 
one-half of energy consumption  is categorized  as energy commodities; 
the remainder, as energy services.)  Thus, food and fuel effects will surely 
constitute  an important share of exchange  rate effects  on the cost  of 
living.  I have  already  noted  that direct  imports  of  nonfood,  nonfuel 
consumer goods are a rather small proportion of the consumption basket. 
From the consumption  data alone it is impossible  to determine  much 
about the direct importance of nonfood,  nonfuel primary commodities, 
23.  Based on data on expenditure weights in the CPI for urban consumers. Jeffrey D. Sachs  137 
which would play a role as inputs into the production of other consumer 
items. 
The framework for measuring "direct"  and "competitiveness"  ef- 
fects  is  as  follows.  I  assume  an  aggregate  production  function  for 
domestically produced consumer goods, of the form Q =  Q(Li,  Ri,E, F, K'), 
where Li, Ri, Ei, Fi, Ki are the primary factor inputs: labor, raw materials 
(nonfood,  nonfuel),  energy,  food,  and capital,  respectively.  The first 
four inputs are treated as variable in the short run, while Ki is treated as 
predetermined.  Markup pricing theory  holds  that the  output price P 
should be a markup over standard unit variable costs,  with productivity 
measured at a normalized or standard capacity level  of output. In logs 
(using lowercase  variables), and ignoring constants, 
(5)  p  =  ot  (w  -  )  +  pr  +  ppe  +  pf  a  +  1  +  p  +  8  =  1, 
withTv =  (log) standard output per manhour. With a variable markup, as 
suggested by competitive  pricing, equation 5 is rewritten with a term Eq 
added, where q =  log Q. 
To obtain consumer prices, pc,  we assume thatpc is a weighted average 
of p and import prices of nonfood,  nonfuel consumer goods, p": 
(6)  pc =  p  +  (1-l)pm. 
The role of pfl comes  through the two  possible  channels  already dis- 
cussed.  First, direct purchases  of finished import goods  by consumers 
should lead to a weight of plh equal to the weight of such goods  in the 
consumption basket, or about 2.5 percent. Second,  domestic producers 
may reduce  profit margins relative  to  the  normal markup implicit in 
equation 5, in order to compete  with foreign suppliers.  In the end, the 
consumer price is written as: 
(7)  pc  =  qot(w -  T)  +  -43pr  +  _qppe  +  rj6pf +  (1  - 
_q)pm- 
Extensive econometric experience with estimation of price equations 
has shown  that the link of pc to the input prices  may involve  lags in 
adjustment. To allow for such lags, equation 7 is estimated allowing for 
polynomial distributed lags for the right-hand variables. In the notation 
that follows, PDL(x, a, b) signifies a polynomial distributed lag on variable 
x, of order a, and length b. No end-point constraints are imposed in any 
of the estimates. 138  Brookin2s Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1985 
Equation 7 is estimated for the period 1970:1-1984:4. Importantly, pe 
and pf are measured by world indexes  for primary inputs of energy and 
food rather than as indices for consumption  expenditure on energy and 
food.24 As noted, the consumption  indices for energy and food already 
include a great deal of processing  of the raw materials. For this reason, 
we should expect the weight on energy and food in the pc equation to be 
far below  the apparent weight  of food  (0.19) and energy  (0.11) in the 
overall consumption basket. 
Two estimates  of equation 7 are shown below.  The first equation is 
an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimate, allowing for first-order serial 
correlation  in the  residuals,  without  imposing  the  condition  that the 
coefficients  sum to 1.0. In the second equation the long-run condition is 
imposed,  with the estimates  also corrected  for serial correlation.  The 
sum of the weights for Ri, Ei, Fi, and Mi is shown below each equation. 
Observe that I proxy for the log of labor productivity,  T, by a time trend 
and (time)2. The unconstrained estimate is as follows,  with t-statistics in 
parentheses. 
tc  0.78  +  1.08 PDL(w,,3,8)  +  0.04 PDL(p;r,3,6) 
(4.0)  (7.3)  (2.4) 
+  0.01 PDL (p e,2,4) +  0.03 PDL (p,f,3,6) 
(1.4)  (2.3) 
+  0.06  PDL (p;n 3,6)  -  0.2 time +  0.00008 (time)2 
(2.0)  (6.7)  (10.8) 
R2 =1  .000; Durbin-Watson  = 2.0; rho = 0.5 
Total tradables weight  =  0.14. 
24.  The following variables are used in the regression: 
pe  price of Saudi crude petroleum exports in U.S.  dollars 
pf  weighted average of Economist commodity indexes for primary food (weight 0.95) and 
beverages (weight 0.05) 
pr  weighted  average of Economist  commodity  indexes  for primary nonfood agriculture 
(weight 0.45) and for primary metals (weight 0.55) 
p"l implicit price deflator for U.S.  consumer good imports, national income and product 
accounts 
w  hourly earnings index for nonsupervisory  workers, nonfarm economy 
pc  (dependent  variable)  personal  consumption  deflator,  national  income  and  product 
accounts 
t  a time trend, equal to 1 in 1960:  1, and increasing by 1 each quarter. Jeffrey D. Sachs  139 
The constrained version is as follows:25 
0.49  +  0.88 PDL (w,,3,8) 
(8.9) 
+  0.05PDL(pI,,3,6)  +  0.02PDL(p,,2,4) 
(2.9)  (2.9) 
0.02 PDL (pf,3,6) +  0.03 PDL (p;t1,3,6) 
(1.6)  (0.8) 
-  0.01 time +  0.00007 (time)2 
(-11.4)  (9.3) 
K2  0.995; Durbin-Watson  =  2.04; rho =  0.83 
Total tradables weight  =  0.11. 
Note  that the primary inputs plus foreign consumer  prices represent a 
substantial  share  of  the  consumption  price,  0.14  percent  in the  first 
equation,  and 0.11 percent in the second.  (The sum of the coefficients 
differs from 0.11 because of rounding error.) 
The next step is to determine the effects of exchange rate movements 
on  the  primary input prices  and  imported  final goods.  When  e  (the 
logarithm of the effective  exchange  rate, measured as units of foreign 
currency per dollar) changes, how much will the input prices move? This 
is a difficult question,  particularly in view of the special features of the 
world markets for food and energy.. A good starting point, however,  is 
to consider the effect of exchange rate movements  on the dollar price of 
a homogeneous  commodity  that trades freely,  without transport costs 
or trade impediments in world markets. As an idealization,  consider the 
raw material Ri to be such a good. 
The appendix derives  an equation for the (log) dollar price pr under 
the assumptions  that: Ri is traded freely throughout the world,  subject 
to the law of one  price;  the  supply  of Ri in each  region is a positive 
function of the local currency price of Ri relative to the local currency 
output price; demand for Ri is a negative function of the same relative 
25.  The unit constraint is imposed in a manner suggested by Robert Gordon. Using the 
lag distribution from the unconstrained  estimation,  a weighted  average wage variable is 
created,  equal to  wi, =  (1Xjw,  ,)/(IXj),  where  Xj  are the PDL  weights  on  w. Then,  the 
regression is re-estimated by subtracting wi, from the left-hand and remaining right-hand 
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price; and developing countries outside of the OECD peg to a basket of 
OECD currencies. The resulting equation has the form: 
(8)  dpr =  dp6 +  4dyit, 
where dp is the percentage change in an index of dollar output prices in 
the  OECD,  constructed  by  converting  each  country's  local  currency 
output price to dollars at the prevailing exchange rate, and then weighting 
these prices in an overall OECD basket; dy"'  is the percentage change in 
weighted average of real incomes  throughout the world; and dp' is the 
percentage change in dollar price of Ri. The United States has a weight 
of -y  in the OECD price index, and the rest of the OECD (ROECD) has a 
weight of (1 -  -y).  In change form, 
(9)  dp3  =  ydp +  (1 -  -y)(dpo  -  de). 
Note  that from equations  8 and 9, at given  levels  of real activity  and 
given domestic  output prices in the United  States  (p) and the ROECD 
(po),  an appreciation of the U.S.  exchange  rate causes  dpr to decline by 
(1 -  -y)de. 
The expression  for y is quite intricate, though the following  rule of 
thumb  applies.  The  larger the  United  States  is  in the  OECD  in the 
production  and consumption  of Ri, the smaller is (1  -  -y), that is,  the 
smaller is the exchange effect of pl'.  If the United States is perfectly small 
(see the appendix for technical conditions),  dp'Ide =  -  1. If the United 
States  constitutes  the  entire  world  market  for  the  commodity, 
dpr/de  =  0. 
In several studies the IMF has estimated commodity  price equations 
of the form in equation  8 for commodities  including food,  beverages, 
agricultural raw materials, and metals.26  The estimates for (1 -  y) center 
on 0.75,  suggesting that a 1 percent appreciation of the dollar leads to a 
fall  in  commodity  prices  of  0.75  percent.  Specifically,  "the  results 
indicate that an appreciation of the U.S.  dollar by 10 percent in a given 
quarter vis-'a-vis other  major currencies  reduces  the  unit  values  by 
somewhat less than 7.5 percent during the same quarter, and by close to 
7.5 percent within a year."27 
26.  These are reported in technical appendixes  of "Nonoil  Primary Commodity Price 
Developments  and Prospects"  of  the  International  Monetary  Fund,  World Economic 
Outlook (May 1983, April 1984, and April 1985). 
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It is interesting to note that using a weight for the United  States  of 
0.25 in equation 9, as suggested  by the IMF studies,  can account  for 
much, though by no means all, of the decline  since  1980:4 in the prices 
of primary inputs relative to U.S.  consumer  prices on the basis of the 
U.S.  exchange  rate movements  alone.  First,  I construct  an ROECD 
index of consumer prices,  po,  using MERM weights for 17 non-United 
States  economies.  Then I compute  the change  in real input prices  in 
terms of U.S.  goods,  ROECD goods,  and the OECD basket including 
U.S. goods and ROECD goods, with weights 0.25 and 0.75, respectively. 
The decline in terms of U.S.  goods is of course always greater than the 
decline in terms of the OECD basket, the gap being due to the U.S.  real 
appreciation. About one-half of the decline in real commodity  prices is 
due to the dollar appreciation.  The other half is due to the fall in real 
commodity prices in terms of the overall OECD basket,  shown in table 
4. Presumably the drop in real input prices vis-'a-vis the overall OECD 
basket is due to: continuing world recession,  particularly in Europe and 
Latin  America;  high world  real interest  rates,  which  have  caused  a 
reduction  of  primary  commodity  inventories;  and  favorable  supply 
conditions for many agricultural commodities.28 
A recent study of grain prices by the U.S.  Department of Agriculture 
reached  conclusions  similar to  those  of  the  IMF  studies,  though the 
USDA  study  indicates  several  amendments  to  the  model  underlying 
equation 8 that must be made in the case  of grain trade.29 In the basic 
model, the USDA  study found that a 10 percent appreciation of the U. S  . 
dollar should reduce grain prices as follows:  7.3 percent for wheat; 6.7 
percent for corn; and 6.3 percent for soybeans.30 These  elasticities  are 
based on the U. S. consumption and production shares of the three grains 
and estimates of demand and supply elasticities,  as in the appendix. The 
authors indicate,  however,  that protectionist  restrictions  in food trade 
should be expected to lower the transmission of the exchange rate since, 
effectively,  the United  States  thereby becomes  a larger proportion of 
the relevant trading area. As already noted, the larger the U.S.  role for 
a commodity  in demand and supply,  the smaller is the exchange  rate 
28.  See  World Economic  Outlook, April 1985, for a detailed discussion  of nonoil and 
oil price developments  and prospects. 
29.  Jim Longmire and Art Morey,  "Strong Dollar Dampens  Demand for U.S.  Farm 
Exports,"  Foreign Agricultural Economic  Report 193 (U.S.  Department of Agriculture, 
Economic Research Service,  December  1983). 
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Table 4.  Change in World Commodity Prices,  1980:4-1984:3 
Percent 
Nominal 
Real price  changec 
price  United  Rest  of  Overall 
Commoditya  changeb  States  OECD  OECD 
Food  -34.6  -45.3  -25.7  -31.2 
Fuel  -  8.9  -  23.8  3.6  -4.0 
Materials  -20.0  -  33.1  -  9.0  -  15.7 
Sources:  IMF,  World Econiomic Olutlook (April 1985), pp.  130-40,  and previous  issues,  and author's calculations, 
based  on  data  from  the  national  income  and  product  accounts  for  U.S.  consumption  deflator  and on  data  from 
Initernationial Finianicial Statistics  for  exchange  rates  and  consumer  prices  in  the  rest  of  the  OECD  (ROECD). 
Commodity  prices are as defined in footnote  24. 
a.  World indexes  for primary inputs. 
b.  Measured in U.S.  dollars. 
c.  Deflated  by consumer  prices.  In the United  States,  real price is defined as Pi/Pc  for commodity  i, where Pc is 
overall personal consumption  deflator. In ROECD,  real price is defined as PiEIPo, where E is the nominal exchange 
rate and PO  is an ROECD index for consumer prices using MERM weights for seventeen  countries outside the United 
States.  The real price in overall  OECD  is pi/[(pC)0.25  (POIE)0.75] 
effect.  The  USDA  accounted  for these  trade impediments  in a rather 
general way,  yielding the following  lower price changes:  -  5.7 percent 
for wheat,  -  5.9 percent for corn; and -  5.9 percent for soybeans.3' 
Last, there is the complicated issue of U.S.  agricultural price supports 
and their interaction with the exchange  rate effect.  For some grains in 
some periods during 1981-84, U.S.  price supports put an effective  floor 
on  prices.  Exchange  rate appreciation  in that case  causes  a smaller 
decline  in dollar prices  and induces  a rise in government  stockpiling. 
The USDA  study models these programs in a very general way but does 
not, unfortunately, analyze the recent experience  with the price support 
programs. In the model, the support programs greatly reduce the short- 
run price responsiveness  for those grains at the price floor, but not the 
longer  run responsiveness.  In the  USDA  model  of the  price  support 
programs, the long-run effect of a 10 percent appreciation on prices still 
exceeds  -  5.0 percent, even with the government programs continuously 
applied .32 
A model such as equation 8 can also be used to account for OPEC oil 
pricing, even though OPEC prices are set by cartel behavior rather than 
by perfect competition.  A full model of OPEC behavior would involve 
some  form  of  dynamic  optimization  of  the  large  producers,  taking 
account  of  the  supply  behavior  of  the  competitive  fringe.  OPEC  oil 
31.  Ibid., table 6. 
32.  Ibid., table 7. Jeffrey D. Sachs  143 
prices should then in general depend on a basket of OECD prices, as in 
equation 9, where the weights  in that basket depend on oil production 
and consumption  shares of the various OECD economies  and perhaps 
on OPEC consumption  shares of OECD commodity  exports.  The U.S. 
share of oil consumption among industrial economies  is about 50 percent 
and the share of production is about 75 percent.33  On the other hand, the 
U.S.  share of  OECD  exports  to  OPEC is  18 percent.  Assuming  that 
OPEC attempts to stabilize the level of oil demand when e changes,  the 
exchange rate effect would be on the order of  -0.5.  Assuming instead 
that OPEC attempts to fix the real price of oil in terms of its consumption 
basket of OECD goods, the exchange rate effect should be as high as -  0.82 
(1 -  0.18). The latter approximation seems closer to the mark. Real oil 
prices in 1984:4 in terms of OECD goods were only 4 percent below their 
1980:4 level,  when the United States has a weight of 0.18 in the OECD 
basket.  In the United  States,  real oil prices,  measured relative to the 
wholesale  price index (WPI), fell by 25 percent during the period, while 
in the rest of the OECD, oil prices rose by 3 percent relative to the WPI. 
In the model below, I will use a single estimate,  8 =  0.25, for all three 
primary commodities.  In solving the model,  the equations for pr, pi,  pe 
are then written as: 
(10)  p, = p  + [0.25pc + (1 -  0.25)(po -  et)]  i =  r,f,e, 
where pC  is measured  as the U.S.  consumption  deflator, and po is an 
ROECD weighted-average consumer price index (MERM weights). The 
term pI is the historical relative price of the input in terms of the OECD 
basket.  I treat shifts in p,5  as exogenous  to exchange  rate movements. 
Note,  as already mentioned, that the choice of 0.25 implicitly attributes 
most,  though not all, of the decline  in real input prices  in the United 
States to exchange rate movements. 
The next step is an equation forp"l, the (log) price of consumer goods 
imported into the United States. In some initial experiments,  I attempted 
to model p"l  as a weighted average of U.S.  consumer prices and ROECD 
consumer prices. The U.S.  consumer prices never entered significantly 
into an equation explaining ptm.  Consistently,  ROECD consumer prices 
entered  significantly into  such  an equation.  Thus,  in the  simulations 
below, I treat  pm as a function of a distributed lag of the dollar-equivalent 
33.  The data refer to  the  International  Energy  Agency  countries.  See  the  Energy 
Information Administration, Monthly Energy Review (January 1984), pp. 101-3. 144  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1  :1985 
consumer price level  of the ROECD.  The specific equation,  estimated 
for 1973:1-1984:4 is: 
p=  -3.3  + 0.89 PDL (po -  et,3,8) 
(6.4)  (4.9) 
R2 =  0.99; Durbin-Watson  =  1.92, rho =  0.9. 
Remember that po is the (log) MERM-weight CPI level in the ROECD. 
According  to  this  equation,  a  10 percent  appreciation  of  the  dollar 
translates into an 8.9 percent decline  in prices of (nonauto) consumer 
goods imported into the United States. 
To  close  the model,  I estimate  a wage  equation  of  standard form, 
relating wage inflation to a distributed lag of price inflation, and to current 
and lagged values of the Perry demographically weighted unemployment 
rate, Ut. The estimated equation is: 
zTr'V  =  0.01  - 
0.002Ut 
-  0.0001U,IU  +  0.98  PDL(rrc1,4,12) 
(11.2)  (2.2)  (0.2)  (9.8) 
R2=  0.75; Durbin-Watson  =  2.00; rho =  0.19. 
The  entire  model  can  be  simulated for the  exchange  rate changes 
since 1980, assuming that the paths of output and foreign currency prices 
are the same for alternative paths of the exchange  rate.34  The model is 
solved  in two versions,  using the unconstrained and constrained equa- 
tions for the consumer price level.  As I have already noted, the uncon- 
strained version of the model will show a significantly larger exchange 
rate effect  than the constrained  version,  since  the weight  of tradable 
goods is higher in the former case.  As a first exercise,  we determine the 
pass-through  of  a  10 percent  currency  appreciation  into  lower  price 
inflation expressed  in percentage points.  (The results for the structural 
model here and below are reported for-fourth  quarter  overfourth quarter.) 
Year- 
1  2  3  4 
Unconstrained  0.7  1.0  0.9  1.0 
Constrained  0.5  0.8  0.6  0.5 
The model as a whole tracks quite well in a dynamic simulation starting 
in 1976:1. In the dynamic simulation, the paths of output, the nominal 
34.  The model consists  of the pl equation,  the wage change equation,  and the input 
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Figure 2.  Dynamic Simulation of U.S.  Inflation, 1976:1-1984:3a 
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Sources:  National income  and product accounts  and author's  simulation as described  in text. 
a.  Quarterly change  in personal consumption  deflator, at annual rate. 
exchange  rate, the real prices of primary inputs, and foreign currency 
consumer prices are taken as exogenous,  so that the model effectively 
solves  for  the  wage-price  dynamics,  with  nominal  wages,  consumer 
prices, and primary input prices changing endogenously  over time. The 
simulation in the unconstrained case is shown in figure 2. Basically,  the 
model misses  about 1 percentage  point of the rise in inflation between 
1979 and  1981, but is  generally  on  track during  1981-84.  For fourth 
quarter over fourth quarter, actual and predicted values of price change, 
in percentage points, are: 
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
(3 quarters) 
Actual  9.5  10.2  7.8  4.9  3.1  3.4 
Predicted  9.1  9.6  7.9  4.7  3.0  3.8 
(The values for 1984 are for the first three quarters at an annual rate.) 
When the  partial effects  of  the  actual  exchange  rate changes  are 
simulated by comparing a path of no change in the nominal exchange 
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reductions  in price inflation coming from the exchange  rate effect  (in 
percentage points): 
1981  1982  1983  1984 
(3 quarters) 
Unconstrained  0.8  1.9  2.4  2.8 
Constrained  0.6  1.5  1.7  1.9 
To further examine the sensitivity of these results, I substitute a "Perry 
wage norm" equation for the wage  equation  in the model.  In a wage 
norm model,  the  change  in nominal  wages  is  determined  mostly  by 
"norms,"orrules  ofthumb, ratherthan by inherited inflation orexpected 
price inflation. In that spirit, I replace  the earlier wage equation  with 
(WI-WI-4)  =  0.3 (Pt-I  -  Pt-5),  which allows for a small (0.3) pass- 
through of lagged  consumer  price  inflation into wages.  The  resulting 
estimates for the effect on price inflation from the dollar appreciation in 
the unconstrained case are: 
1981  1982  1983  1984 
Exchange  rate  effect 
with Perry  wage norm  0.7  1.5  1.4  1.1 
Clearly, my own high estimates of the inflation effect as of 1984 depend 
on a significant effect  of lagged prices on nominal wage change.  In the 
Perry model, the exchange rate effects are largely dissipated by 1984. Cf 
course,  such a model must resort to some explanation for the downward 
shift in the wage norm after 1981. 
Consider,  finally, a decomposition  of the causes  of the disinflation 
into exchange rates, unemployment,  and favorable exogenous  "supply- 
price"  shocks.  First, the model is run for a constant nominal exchange 
rate after 1980:4, and the difference of that path from the full dynamic 
simulation path with actual exchange  rate changes is the exchange  rate 
component.  Then the model is run with the unemployment  rate held at 
the  nonaccelerating  inflation rate of  unemployment  (NAIRU)  at the 
historical exchange rates. (The NAIRU  level is 6.1 percent for the Perry 
unemployment  rate in the estimated  wage equations  reported earlier.) 
The difference of that path from the original simulation is the output gap 
component.  Third, the model is run assuming no fall in the real prices of 
primary inputs in terms of the OECD basket  (that is, pi is fixed at its 
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termed the real-input price effect. The breakdown of the price disinflation 
is as follows  (in percentage points): 
1981  1982  1983  1984 
(3 qtuarters) 
Total  slowdown  1.8  4.7  6.5  6.2 
Unconstrained  version, 
sources  of slowdown 
Exchange  rate  0.8  1.9  2.4  2.8 
Unemployment  - 0.2  1.6  3.9  3.4 
Real  input  price  0.9  1.9  1.5  1.4 
Lagged inflation and residuals  0.3  -  0.7  -  1.3  -  1.4 
Constrained  version, 
sources  of slowdown 
Exchange  rate  0.6  1.5  1.7  1.9 
Unemployment  -0.2  1.4  3.2  2.3 
Real  input  price  0.5  1.4  1.2  0.8 
Lagged  inflation  and  residuals  0.9  0.4  0.4  1.3 
Thus, estimates  of the exchange  rate effect  range between  1.9 and 2.8 
percentage points for 1984. In both versions of the model, the exchange 
rate effect is slightly less than the unemployment  effect. 
Prospects for the Dollar and U.S. Inflation 
If the real appreciation of the dollar could be attributed to a permanent 
shift in such underlying conditions  as a restoration  of confidence  or a 
safe haven effect,  then we  could  chalk up a permanent benefit in the 
disinflation process-perhaps  almost 3 percentage points of inflation last 
year alone. The evidence  is strongly to the contrary,  however.  In this 
section I show that the market's own forecasts  continue to predict large 
dollar depreciations in the coming decade,  depreciations  that will have 
a significant effect on U.S.  inflation. 
In most interpretations of recent movements  in the dollar, high U.S. 
interest rates are a major proximate cause.  A standard story, based on 
Dornbusch's overshooting  model, goes as follows.  Assets  denominated 
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they  must earn a nearly equal expected  return when  the  returns are 
expressed  in a common  currency.  Let  i,  be the nominal yield  (on an 
annual basis) of a riskless  n-year asset  denominated  in dollars, and let 
i* be the nominal yield on a foreign riskless asset of the same maturity. 
(Hereafter,  an asterisk  denotes  a foreign  variable.)  With E, the  spot 
exchange  rate, expressed  as units of foreign currency  per dollar, and 
,Et+n the exchange  rate expected  to  prevail in n years,  the  expected 
dollar denominated  return of the foreign asset  (on an annual basis)  is 
(EtItEt+  )(11n)(I + i*)  -  1.3  With  perfect  substitutability  of  home  and 
foreign assets,  as would be implied, for example,  by risk-neutral wealth 
holders and an absence of capital controls, home and foreign yields must 
be equalized. Thus, we would have i4,  equal to this quantity, or: 
(11)  ~~~(I  +  i,,)  =  (Et1tEt+JI'1''0(  +  i*. 
Below,  I describe  one simple model that is not too bad empirically. 
In it, the real exchange  rate in the long run is presumed to be fixed at a 
given constant level though it might deviate from that level in the short 
run because  of the slowness  of prices to adjust to long-run equilibrium 
levels.  Let R be the fixed long-run value of (PE/P*), and Rt be its current 
value.  Suppose  also  that,  by whatever  equilibrating mechanisms,  the 
market expects R, to return to R within a period of n years. 
Now,  let us define the term w,, as the average  annual inflation rate 
expected  over  the  n-year  interval  so  that  tPt+,  =  (1  +  Tr,,)'Pt  and 
tPt*  -  =(1  +  a*T)'P*.  Also,  define the n-year real interest rates at home 
and  abroad  as  (1  +  r,)  =  (1  +  i,,)  (Pt/Pt+,)11'n  and  (1  +  r*) 
(1 +  i*) (P/tltP*+ )"n  . By these definitions,  equation  11 may be restated 
as: 
(12)  (a) 
EtP,/P* = R [(1 +  r,7)/(1  +  r*)]J, 
(b) Et =  (P*/Pt)R[(1 +  rj)l(l  +  r*)]', 
or with a log approximation: 
(13)  (a) 
(et + pt -  p,*) =  logR + n(r,,  -  r*) 
(b) et =  (p* -  pt) +  logR  + n(r,, -  r,). 
35.  I commit the minor sin of setting (1/E)e  =  l/Ee, where "e"  signifies expectations. 
This is for expositional  ease,  and is exactly  correct only if the expectations  are held with 
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According  to equation  12a, the current real exchange  rate equals  the 
long-term real exchange  rate times the ratio of real interest rates to the 
nth power. In logs,  the log real exchange  rate equals a constant  plus n 
times the n period real interest rate differential,  as shown  in equation 
13a. According  to  equation  12b, the  current  nominal  exchange  rate 
equals the current price ratio, times the long-term real exchange  rate, 
times the ratio of gross interest rates to the nth power. The log version 
of the equation is shown as equation 13b. 
As  we  can  see,  small  changes  in  the  long-term  real  interest  rate 
differential will have a large effect on the current exchange rate. Suppose 
that home and foreign prices can be taken as given in the current period, 
and that the real exchange  rate is always expected  to adjust to R within 
a ten-year period. Then,  a 1 percentage  point rise in the ten-year U.S. 
real interest rate relative  to the foreign ten-year  real interest rate will 
have a 10 percentage point effect on the spot exchange rate today. 
The twin assumptions  that interest rate differentials reflect expected 
exchange  rate changes,  and that the  long-term  real exchange  rate is 
constant,  go a long way towards tracking exchange  rate movements  in 
the past decade. To show this, let us apply the framework to the dollar- 
deutsche mark rate. This is a particularly useful rate to examine,  since 
unlike France,  Japan, and the  United  Kingdom,  West  Germany  had 
no  capital  controls  in  the  past  decade,  so  the  assumption  of  high 
substitutability  of  dollar  and  deutsche  mark assets  is  plausible.  For 
interest rates we take indexes  of long-term government  bonds in each 
country.  The expected  inflation variable is calculated  as follows.  For 
each  year,  I take  the  "long-term"  inflation expectation  to  equal  the 
actual two-year  inflation rate centered  on the quarter of the estimate 
(that is, the average of inflation in the personal consumption deflator one 
year ahead and one  year behind).  However,  in the case  of the United 
States,  I allow for a shift in inflation expectations  that depends  on the 
1980 election.  For  the  four  quarters of  1980, I assume  that inflation 
forecasts  were made conditional  on the outcome  of the election,  with 
inflation expectations  of 10 percent in the quarters after 1980 if President 
Carter were to win reelection,  and inflation of its actual rate after 1980 if 
Reagan were to win the election.  The probability assigned  to Carter's 
reelection is set at 0.5. In this way, I build in a downward shift in inflation 
expectations upon President Reagan's election.  This shift seems neces- 
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Figure 3.  Inflation Expectations, United States and West Germany, 1977:1-1984:4 
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Source:  See  text  description.  The  inflation  expectation  is  the  average  of  the  actual  change  in  the  personal 
consumption  deflator one  year ahead and one  year behind,  centered  in the quarter of the estimate. 
election in November  1980. The resulting paths for inflation expectations 
are shown  in figure 3. The long-term real interest  rates are shown  in 
figure 4. 
An exchange  rate equation as in equation  13 fits the data rather well 
for 1977:1-1984:4 for the deutsche mark-dollar rate  . Estimating equation 
13 using the real interest rate differential that we have calculated, we get 
the equations  shown  in table 5.  In the first equation,  equation  13a is 
estimated using OLS. The real interest rate differential is highly signifi- 
cant, with the coefficient value indicating an expectation  of the return of 
R, to R in 6.5 years. Note  that because  of the flatness of the yield curve 
for  maturities  greater  than  5  years,  (r  -  r*) can  be  interpreted  as 
representing  the  interest  rate differential over  any long interval.  The 
equation picks 6.5 as the maturity length that is most consistent  with the 
maintained hypothesis  that R, returns to its long-run value R within the 
interval. Note the low Durbin-Watson statistic in the estimate, suggesting 
some misspecification  of the equation.  Data inspection  reveals that the 
dollar was  weaker  than expected  in the  recession  period  in  1981:3- 
1982:4, and somewhat  stronger than predicted  in 1983. Similarly,  the Jeffrey D. Sachs  151 
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bonds yields; inflation expectations  series  is the one  plotted in figure 3. 
mark was weak during periods of slow West German growth. This 
suggests  that  the real  exchange  rate  strengthens,  for a given interest  rate 
differential,  when the economy is experiencing  above-average  growth, 
which  is confirmed  in the second equation  in table 5, which includes  the 
difference  in GNP growth  rates  in the United States and  West Germany, 
Q -  Q*.  This variable  may be picking  up shifts in expectations about 
the long-run real exchange rate (contrary to our simple model) or 
reflecting  a rise in capital  inflow  that occurs when profits  are high  at the 
upswing  of the cycle. In the third  regression,  an instrumental  variable  is 
used to help correct  for errors  in measurement  of the real  exchange  rate 
differential.  On  the view that  the differential  fiscal  stimulus  in the United 
States  and  West  Germany  is the cause of the real  interest  rate  differential, 
an index  of this difference  is created  to serve as an instrument,  based on 
an IMF  measure  of fiscal impulse  in the two countries.  The result  of the 
instrumental  variables  estimation  is shown in the third  equation  of the 
table. Note that the point estimate  on the interest rate differential  rises 
to 0.068. 
Using the inflation  forecasts and the actual  path of interest  rates, we 152  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1985 
Table 5.  Real Deutsche Mark-Dollar  Exchange Rate Equations,  1977:1-1984:4 
(1)  logR,  =  4.62  +  0.065(r,  -  r,*) 
(309.4)  (11.52) 
R2  =  0.81; Durbin-Watson  =  0.71 
(2)  logR,  =  4.60  +  0.056(r,  -  r,)  +  0.020(Q,  -  Q*) 
(418.0)  (13.6)  (4.44) 
R2  =  0.90; Durbin-Watson  =  1.44 
(3)  logR,  =  4.60  +  0.068(r,  -  r,*) +  -  0.015(Q,  -  Q*) 
(362.8)  (10.5)  (2.77) 
with instrumental variable (G  -  G*) for (r -  r*) 
R2  =  0.87; Durbin-Watson  =  1.20 
Source:  Equation  13. R,  is  EPIP*,  where  E  is  deutsche  marks per dollar,  P  is  the  consumption  deflator in the 
United  States,  P* is the CPI in West  Germany,  and r,r* are long-term real interest  rates,  as calculated  in the text. 
Q,  Q* are real GNP growth rates,  fourth quarter over  fourth quarter. The  instrument (G  -  G*) is the cumulative 
difference  in the "fiscal  impulse"  (effectively,  the difference  in the full employment  surpluses,  as calculated  by the 
IMF). Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
can also invert  equation 13  to find  the expectation  of the long-term  real 
exchange rate conditional  on the assumption  that the real interest rate 
measures  the expected rate of real depreciation  over the interval  of the 
bond. This "long-term"  real exchange rate may be calculated  for each 
time period, as is done for the interval 1977:1-1984:4. As per the 
econometric  estimates we assume that Rt returns  to R in seven years. 
The result is shown in figure 5. According to these estimates, real 
appreciation  of the dollar  does not reflect  the expectation  of a long-term 
appreciation  of the dollar, but rather  of a short-run  deviation from a 
fairly  constant  long-run  rate. In 1977:  1, the market  projection  was for a 
long-term  real exchange rate of 110.7 (with the spot market real rate 
equal to 100  in 1977:  1), and the average  projection  for 1984  was 110.0. 
The 53.2 percent  real  appreciation  between 1977:1  and 1984:4  is consis- 
tent with unchanged long-term  real exchange rate expectations and a 
rise in U.S. real  interest  rates  relative  to West German  real  interest  rates 
of about  5.3 percentage  points between 1977  and 1984. 
If the expectations model is accepted, the fact that long-term  real 
interest  rates are far higher  in the United States than in West Germany 
and Japan means that expectations are for a dollar depreciation at 
approximately  the rate of interest rate differential  for the next several Jeffrey D. Sachs  153 
Figure 5.  Real Exchange Rate and Long-Term Real Exchange Rate Expectation, 
Deutsche Mark-Dollar,  1977:1-1984:4 
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Source:  International Monetary Fund, Itnternational Fintancial Statistics,  and equation  13. See  text description. 
years  (the data  suggest  about  a 30 percent  real  depreciation  vis-'a-vis  the 
deutsche  mark  over the next seven years). A skeptic can argue  that  this 
interest  rate  differential  has been present  for the past four years, during 
which time the dollar  has continued  to appreciate,  so that the "expec- 
tations" in the expectations model have never been borne out. The 
response to this observation  in terms of the expectations hypothesis is 
that there have been continual surprises in terms of long-term real 
interest  rate differentials  over the period. U.S. long-term  interest  rates 
have  stayed  unexpectedly  high,  and  the rate  of U.S. inflation  has  dropped 
unexpectedly  rapidly. The dollar has strengthened  in each of the past 
three years because the real interest rate differential  continued  to rise, 
and  most of that  rise was probably  unanticipated. 
Let us assume  that  the analysis  is correct, and proceed  to investigate 
the inflationary  consequences of a future  depreciation  of the dollar.  As 
usual,  we examine  the partial  effect for a fixed  path  of output  and  foreign 
inflation.  Suppose, then, that  the dollar  will depreciate  30 percent  in the 
seven years. If the drop  is sharp  and swift (the hard  landing  scenario  in 
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inflation will  likewise  be  sharp.  If the  drop is  slow,  the  inflationary 
consequences  in any year will be muted, but the adjustment will take 
longer. According to our structural estimates,  in the unconstrained case, 
the inflationary consequences  of a hard landing, defined as 10 percent 
depreciation  per year for three years,  and a soft landing, defined as 5 
percent depreciation per year for seven years, beginning in 1986, are as 
follows  (in percentage points, fourth quarter over fourth quarter): 
1986  1987  1988 
Hard  landing  0.7  1.7  2.6 
Soft landing  0.4  0.9  1.3 
These  are not forecasts  of the price inflation following  a decline  in the 
dollar, since they assume for analytical purposes that the path of output 
is independent of the path of the exchange rate. As noted later, the policy 
authorities might well choose  to respond to a sharp drop in the dollar 
with a mild recession,  to mute the inflationary consequences. 
The Strong Dollar as a Macroeconomic  Strategy 
It is time now  to turn to the question  raised at the opening  of the 
paper. Does  it make sense  to pursue a policy  mix aiming at a strong 
currency  for the purpose  of easing  the costs  of  disinflation? Can the 
"sacrifice  ratio" be reduced by a strong dollar in the early phase of a 
disinflation, or does the strategy merely push the costs  into the future? 
If in fact the total costs of disinflation are unchanged over the long term, 
is there any justification left for pursuing such a policy? Finally, even if 
the policy  makes  sense  from a single  country's  point of  view,  is the 
decision  to  pursue  such  a  policy  essentially  a  beggar-thy-neighbor 
decision? What happens if all countries try to pursue the strong currency 
approach? 
I turn first to an extended  discussion  of the policy  mix from a single 
country's point of view,  and later to some of the multicountry issues. 
Mundell's original notion in the 1971 essay is that a mix of tight money 
and expansionary fiscal policy can reduce inflation and maintain output 
at the  same  time.  In principle,  the  short-term  sacrifice  ratio can  be 
reduced  to zero  if all of the disinflation is brought about by currency 
appreciation, with fiscal policy being expansionary enough to offset the Jeffrey D. Sachs  155 
contractionary  tendencies of tight money. A numerical  illustration  is 
shown  in table  6.36  The policy multipliers  shown are from  the Economic 
Planning  Agency of Japan  (EPA) model and are the average effects of 
shifts  in monetary  policy, M, and  fiscal  policy, G, over a two-year  period. 
Below, I will offer independent  estimates of these effects that display 
somewhat  larger  movements  in the exchange rate  for a given change in 
policy. (In the EPA model, exchange rate expectations are essentially 
backward-looking,  while in the model below, they are  forward-looking. 
That and my assumption of very high asset substitutability  between 
currencies seem to be the major  distinctions in the magnitude  of the 
estimated  effects.) 
In every country, a normalized  fiscal expansion is less inflationary 
than  a normalized  monetary  expansion. (By "normalized  expansion," I 
mean  a change  in G or M sufficient  to raise output  by 1  percentage  point 
on average  in the first  two years). Consequently,  a fiscal  expansion  with 
an exactly offsetting monetary contraction  leaves output unchanged, 
but  inflation  lower. In  Japan,  for  example,  a 2.5 percentage  point  increase 
in discount rates, balanced  by a 0.64 percent of GNP fiscal expansion, 
leaves output unchanged, but reduces inflation  by 0.41 (0.59 -  0.18) 
percentage  point-a  zero sacrifice ratio. Is this the long sought anti- 
inflation  machine?  No, for two reasons. First, the policy works through 
a currency  appreciation  that raises prices abroad,  in the countries  with 
the counterpart  depreciating  currencies.  Thus, while Japan's  inflation  is 
costlessly reduced by the policy mix, world inflation  as a whole is left 
(approximately)  unchanged.  In the case of Japan,  according  to the EPA 
model, the repercussion  effects on inflation  rates in West Germany  and 
the United States appear to be very small. Since Japan alone is a 
relatively  small  part  of the OECD economy, a given inflation  reduction 
in Japan  translates  into a much smaller inflation  increase in the other 
OECD  economies. For  a very small  country,  a given  reduction  in  inflation 
at home  will be balanced  by a negligible  increase  abroad,  but an average 
of world  inflation,  which gives the small country  very little weight, will 
show basically  no change. 
Second,  the policy mix is probably  not sustainable  for long. Note that 
the proposed  policy mix also worsens the current  account, in this case 
36. Gilles  Oudiz  and  Jeffrey  Sachs, "Macroeconomic  Policy  Coordination  among  the 
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by (-0.13)  minus (-0.02),  or by 0.11 percent of GNP in Japan. Over 
time, those external  deficits would cause foreign  indebtedness  to build, 
which would reduce real consumption  opportunities  of future genera- 
tions, and, for a variety of reasons, eventually cause the currency to 
depreciate. 
According  to the EPA model, even the short-run  usefulness  of a shift 
to fiscal  expansion  and monetary  contraction  appears  to be rather  small 
in the United States, since there is little quantitative  effect of either 
policy on inflation.  Based on the evidence presented  earlier  in the paper, 
the opportunities  for the United States have probably  been much  greater 
than  shown in the EPA model. 
It is  useful to  consider a  single-period optimization problem of 
macroeconomic  authorities  presented with the opportunities  just ex- 
amined. Suppose that policymakers  have a quadratic  utility  function  in 
three targets:  output  (measured  as a gap from potential),  inflation,  and 
the current  account:37 
(14)  U=  -(1/2)(Q2  +  4iir2 +  [LCA2). 
Suppose further  that the relationship  between M and G and the three 
fiscal  targets  may be described  in reduced  form  as: 
(15)  Q  =  M + G +  Q0 
,T =  aM,M  +  aG,G  +  7To 
CA  =  -  aMCM  -  aGcG +  CAo. 
Because fiscal expansion tends to appreciate  the exchange rate, or at 
least to cause a smaller  depreciation  than monetary  policy, we expect 
the value of aG,  to be less than am,  and the value of aGC  to be greater 
than amc.  That is, consistent  with the results of table 6, fiscal expansion 
is less inflationary  than is monetary  expansion, and fiscal expansion is 
more  adverse  for the external  balance  than  is monetary  policy. 
Now suppose  that  the economy has an inflation  problem,  in the sense 
that  if it chooses to set M = G = 0 (these are  policy settings  as deviations 
from  a baseline  level), it achieves full employment  and  external  balance, 
but has an inflation  rate above the optimum. Specifically, we set the 
constants  Qo  and CAo  to zero, and set -zo  > 0. What  policy mix should 
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the country pursue? By setting dU/dM  =  0 and dU/dG  =  0, we find the 
following  optimum  choices for M and G: 
(16)  M  =  - OMOT  <  ? 
G =  OGTO>O, 
where  Om =J(aM,  -  aGJ)  +  >I4aGC(aGcaM  -aGwaMc)  >  0 
0  =(aMw  -  aG.)  +  II4aMC(aGCaM,  aGwaMc) >  0 
=L(aMC-  aGC)2  +  4(aMw  -  aG.)2 
+  L(amwaGC  -  aGwa  MC)2 >  0. 
As expected, the optimal  policy is to choose M less than zero, and G 
greater  than zero, and thereby reduce inflation  at the cost of a larger 
external deficit. By substituting  equation 12 back into the structural 
model, we find  the selected levels of the three  targets: 
(17)  Q =  -8Q7T 
IT  =  8b7TITo 
CA  =  -  cnoq 
where  =  IJL(aMc -  aGC) (aGcaMs,  -  aGsaMc) 
,=  (aMc  -  aGC)  4 (aM  -  aG)  > 
as=  1 -  (ll/A)[4(aGw  -  aM)2 
+  pL4(aGcaMm -  aGsaMC)2]  <  1. 
The built-in inflation is  met by policy actions that reduce output, 
implicitly  overvalue  the exchange  rate, and cause an external  deficit. 
Note that the policy mix may be reversed if the economy inherits  an 
external  balance problem  in addition  to an inflation  problem. Suppose 
now that CAo  is negative, while aro  remains  positive. Now a choice of 
M =  G = 0 would leave the country with full employment,  but with high Jeffrey D. Sachs  159 
inflation  and an external deficit beyond the desired level. Optimizing 
once again,  we find  the following  set of preferred  policies: 
(18)  M  =  -OMTO  +  YMCAO 
G  =  OGTO -  YGCAO, 
where  yM =  [t(aGC  -  aMc)  +  IjIaGw (aGcaMw  -  aMcaGw)  >  0 
YG  =  [t(aGC  -  aMc)  +  j+iamw  (aGcaMw  -  aMcaG,)  >  0 
OM, OG, A as in equation  16. 
Note that the following four structural  characteristics  militate  against 
the Mundell  mix: a high structural  external  deficit  (that  is, a large value 
of CAO);  a high  loss parameter  1t  on external  deficits;  a poor trade-off  of 
output  growth and external  deficit, as given by the coefficient on G in 
the current account equation,  aGC  (that is, a normalized fiscal stimulus 
causes a large  worsening  of external  balance);  and  a small  differential  in 
the inflation effects of M and G (as measured by am,  -  aGJ)- 
So much  for the static version  of the model. We have seen in practice 
that  the large  appreciation  of the dollar  is expected to be reversed  in the 
next ten years, so that the short-run  gains to inflation  will later be lost. 
What  are the merits of the strategy  given that real exchange rate gains 
tend to be temporary?  Stanley Fischer has recently pointed out that 
these merits  depend crucially  on the type of wage-price  process in the 
economy.38  In settings  where wages are "backward-looking"  functions 
of inflation,  the merits will tend to be qualitatively  different than in 
economies with wage change depending on rational expectations of 
future  policy actions. Fischer's  analysis  is extremely  illuminating  on this 
point, though  his focus is on shifts in the sacrifice  ratio  when monetary 
policy and capital  controls are the instruments  available  to the macro- 
economic authorities,  and he does not consider fiscal policy. The next 
section extends his analysis to the question of the policy mix of fiscal 
and  monetary  variables. 
Consider first the case of backward-looking  wage behavior. As a 
simple illustration,  assume that wage change equals lagged CPI price 
change  plus lagged  output  gap, and the CPI is a markup  over domestic 
wages and foreign  goods prices. The foreign currency  price of foreign 
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output  is fixed, and  foreign  producers  fully pass exchange  rate changes 
into domestic prices. In log levels, we have the following  relationships: 
(19)  t=  t-I  +  Qt-I 
pc  =  Xwt +  (1  -  X) (p*  -  et) 
Rt  =  pc  +  et  -  P* 
This system yields the following  equation  for inflation: 
(20)  rTr  =  1TC-1 +  4~Qt-  -  O(Rt -  Rt-)I  0 =  (1-  MIX. 
Current  inflation  equals  lagged  inflation,  plus  an  output  effect, plus  a neg- 
ative effect for appreciations  of the real exchange rate (Rt -  Rt- l) < 0. 
For the dynamic  problem,  the utility function is now written as the 
discounted sum of period-by-period  utilities, with a discount factor 3 
less  than one  (technically, I  am assuming an additively separable 
intertemporal  loss function).  I also write utility directly  as a function  of 
R, rather  than  the current  account balance  (and  drop  the superscript  on 
7T  for convenience): 
(21)  V-  -1/2Eot=It(Q2  +  fu7T2  + pLR2). 
The  economy  inherits  a given  rate  of wage  inflation  at t = 0, and  thereafter 
pursues  an optimal  path  of policies of M and G, a path  that  minimizes  V 
in equation  21. Instead of focusing on M and G, I more simply assume 
that  these two instruments  can be used to control  the two targets  Q,  and 
Rt in each period. At time zero I assume that the economy begins with 
the real exchange rate RO =  0. In this illustration, the government 
credibly commits itself to the entire future sequence of actions (an 
assumption  to which I return,  skeptically,  later  on). 
Before solving for the optimum  policy, let us examine the options 
actually  open to the policymaker.  By solving equation  20 forward  for T 
periods,  we see that  inflation  at time T  is a function  of inherited  inflation, 
+  times the cumulative  output  loss between t = 0 and t = T, and  the level 
of the real  exchange  rate  at T: 
(22)  'TT  =  IT 
T 
-  E  Qt  -  ORT 
Aside from the issue of whether the policy authority  could actually 
commit  to a permanent  rise in R (and  obtain  sufficient  foreign  finance  to 
run  the implied  current  account  deficits),  it will not in fact be optimal  for Jeffrey D. Sachs  161 
the policymaker  to choose  such a course  in this example.  Over time, 
optimal policy implies that inflation return to zero,  output return to full 
employment,  and R return to zero,  given the utility function assumed 
here.  Hence,  as  T gets  large,  we  expect  RT  to  approach zero.  From 
equation 22 we can see an important result, first shown by Willem Buiter 
and Marcus Miller.39  In an economy with backward-looking wage setters, 
in which  the long-term real exchange  rate returns to its  initial level, 
either perforce or given an optimal policy  path, the cumulative  output 
loss  necessary  to reduce a given inherited inflation to zero in the long 
run is fixed and independent of the path of the real exchange rate that is 
followed.  To see this, simply let T get large in equation 22, let RTtend to 
zero, and examine the case in which XT  goes to zero. Then we see that 
the cumulative output loss is simply given as: 
(23)  looQt  =  -  7No/(+ 
The long-term sacrifice ratio, defined as the cumulative output loss from 
t= 0 to t = oo,  divided by the reduction in inflation,  aor0  is a constant that 
is independent of the exchange  rate strategy. Specifically,  the sacrifice 
ratio is  (1/4),  where  +  is  the  Phillips  curve  parameter  in the  wage 
equation. 
Does this mean that Mundell is wrong, and that there is nothing to be 
gained from a strong currency policy? The answer is no. With reasonable 
assumptions on intertemporal utility, the policy mix of tight money and 
loose  fiscal policy,  or, equivalently,  of increases  in R,  still may make 
sense  in the  beginning  phase  of  disinflation.  The  short-run gains  on 
inflation from raising Rt above zero may plausibly exceed  the longer run 
costs  of higher inflation when Rt returns to zero.  The key assumption 
that can make this the case is that there are increasing marginal costs of 
inflation, so that on the margin a reduction  in inflation from,  say,  10 
percentage points per year to 9 percentage points per year has a higher 
utility value, in terms of output that would be willingly forgone,  than a 
reduction in inflation from 2 percentage  points  to  1 percentage  point. 
This kind of effect  is  eminently  plausible,  most  directly  because  the 
excess burden of taxes,  including the inflation tax, can be described as a 
39.  Willem Buiter and Marcus Miller,  "Real  Exchange  Rate Overshooting  and the 
Output Cost of Bringing Down  Inflation,"  Euiropean Economic  Review,  vol.  18, (May- 
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function of the square of the tax rate. This assumption  is clearly built 
into the quadratic  utility  function  in equation  21. 
Consider  the formal  optimization  of V in equation  21 subject to the 
constraints in equation 20. Let A, be the shadow cost in terms of 
intertemporal  utility  of an increment  to inherited  inflation  at time t. The 
first-order  conditions  for the dynamic  optimization  are then given as:40 
(24)  (a) Qt =  -  At 
(b) Rt  =  [+O/flFt 
(c) At  =  At-  1/  -  t 
In (a) we have the obvious result that the optimal  output  contraction  in 
period t is greater  the larger  is the welfare cost on inherited  inflation  in 
period t, At. An optimal  disinflation  path  begins with a steep recession, 
followed  by a gradual  return  to full  employment  as the inflation  rate  ebbs 
to zero. More important  for our purposes, note that (b) shows that Rt 
should be proportional  to inflation  along the optimal  disinflation  path. 
In other words, along an optimal  path, there is an initial  real exchange 
rate appreciation  when inflation  is high, and a declining  real exchange 
rate  as inflation  returns  to zero. This  path  does not gain  anything  in terms 
of the long-term  sacrifice  ratio,  but  it raises  utility  relative  to a disinflation 
path  with a constant  real exchange  rate. The reason is simple:  raising  R 
early  in the process exports some of the inflation  abroad  without  having 
to incur further costly output losses; later on, the same amount of 
inflation  is imported  as R falls. The welfare  gain  arises  from  the fact that 
the marginal  utility  gain  from  a unit  of inflation  reduction  when inflation 
is high (early  in the disinflation)  exceeds the marginal  utility  loss from  a 
unit  of inflation  increase  later  on, when the inflation  rate  is already  low. 
40.  Set up the formal Lagrangian: 
?  =  f3=P t(Q2 +  +r,N2  +  pR  2)/2 
-tA,  [  -,c  c - 4-Qt +  O(Rt+I  -R)]. 
Then the first-order conditions are found by setting a?/8a, =  0, a?/aQ,  0, a?/aRt  0 for 
t >1. 
Specifically, 
afla,a  0  =  O  -  ,t  =  At,  /  -  At 
a?1aR  0  =  O  -  R,  =  OAt I/  -  OA, 
a?/aQt =  0  Qt  =  -4At. 
Combining the first two equations,  we see also that R, = Jeffrey D. Sachs  163 
In broad  outline, then, the Reagan  disinflation  has had some, but not 
other, characteristics  of an optimal  disinflation  path. The process began 
with a deep recession, and was followed by a gradual  return to full 
employment.  The real exchange rate was increased  in the early part  of 
the  disinflation,  and  will  presumably  fall  in the later  stages  of the process. 
Of course, depending  on the weights one attaches to inflation,  output, 
and  external  balance  in the utility  function,  different  degrees  of recession 
or real appreciation  will be called for. The question we pick up later, 
however, is whether  the continuation  of current  policies is likely to be 
appropriate  as well. Note that an optimal path builds in a steady real 
depreciation after the initial appreciation. This model and the later 
results  suggest  that  the actual  U.S. fiscal  expansion  has been carried  too 
far, too long, from the point of view of optimal  disinflation.  As inflation 
was reduced,  the dollar  should  have depreciated  in real  terms, according 
to the model. Exactly the opposite has occurred  to date. 
In an economy with forward-looking  wage setters, it may be possible 
to gain even more by the Mundell strategy. Indeed, in some not- 
implausible  models, the sacrifice  ratio  can be reduced  to almost zero by 
a policy of fiscal expansion and monetary  contraction  in the first  phase 
of disinflation.  As an extreme illustration,  consider the earlier model, 
but now with a wage process in which the (log) wage for period  t +  1 is 
set in t, but based on forward-looking  expectations of the price level. 
The wage equation  becomes: 
(25)  Wt+1  =  tPtC+19 
where  tpc+ 1 signifies  the expectation  of consumer  prices in period  t +  1, 
held as of period  t. In each period, the nominal  wage is predetermined, 
so that macroeconomic  policymakers  retain period-by-period  control 
over the output  level in the economy. The change between periods in 
the wage, however, depends  on expectations  of future  policies. 
The remaining  structure of the economy is as follows. Output is 
demand  determined,  with aggregate  demand  a decreasing  function  of Rt 
and  an  increasing  function  of Gt.  Consumer  prices  are  a weighted  average 
of w and  p* - e as in equation 19. Since R = pc +  e  -  p*, we also have 
R  =  A(w +  e  -  p*). Foreign prices p * are held constant and normalized 
at zero. The demand  and  price equations  can therefore  be written: 
(26)  Qt =  -  (wt  +  et) +  Gt 
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We can think  of the policymaker  as choosing  et  and  G,  in the period,  with 
e  implicitly controlled by  monetary policy,  which we  hold in the 
background  for the moment. 
Now, suppose that  the economy inherits  some wage inflation,  in that 
w, exceeds  w,-1.  The  exchange  rate at t  -  1 is given  as  et-,.  Thus, 
consumer  price inflation  in the current  period  is given by: 
(27)  -rtC  =  ptC -  Ptc-I  =  x(wt  -  wt)  -  (1  -  X)(e,  -et-). 
From the assumption  of forward-looking  wage behavior, wage setters 
note that expected pc+ 1 equals the nominal  exchange rate expected in 
the following period. This is because Pc+  =  wt  +1 -  (1 -  X)e,  + , and 
with wt  +  , equal  to pc+ 1, we have w+  =  -et+, 
There is no fixed sacrifice  ratio in this economy, either in the short 
run or in the long run. One strategy  for policymakers  is to absorb the 
current  inflation  with an accommodating  exchange rate or fiscal policy, 
that  is, with G,  high  enough  or e, low enough  to hold output  fixed, and  to 
announce  a value of the future  exchange  rate  equal  to today's consumer 
price level. After one period of inflation, the inflation  rate vanishes 
costlessly. More  strikingly,  using  the Mundell  strategy,  the  policymakers 
can eliminate  current  inflation  as well, and  still  maintain  full  employment 
throughout.  The idea is straightforward:  the exchange rate today is set 
at a high enough level so that current inflation  is zero. According to 
equation 27, et is chosen to equal [X(wt -  w, -)  +  (1 -  X)et  -]/(I  -  X). 
This involves a real appreciation  in the long-run  value R in the amount 
X(wt -  w,  1)/  (1 -  X). Then fiscal policy is expanded sufficiently so that 
aggregate  demand  is not reduced  by the high  real  exchange  rate. For the 
next period,  policymakers  announce  a value of the future  exchange  rate 
so that et+  I = pc, and a return  of fiscal policy to zero. Wages  for period 
t +  1 then revert to a noninflationary  level, and the real exchange rate 
returns  to zero. Note that  workers  get a big real wage increase  in period 
t from the real exchange rate appreciation  in period t, which they then 
willingly  give up in period  t +  1. 
The Mundell  mix, then, allows for a complete  elimination  of inflation 
at zero output cost.  Suppose that policymakers instead reduce the 
current inflation  through  exchange rate policy alone, that is, through 
tight money, without the benefit of fiscal expansion. In that case, et 
would be moved to the level we just found, but now output would fall 
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by  -  [o/(1  -  X)](w,  -  w,  1). Obviously,  the  Mundell  strategy  has 
improved  the path of output, even when viewed over the entire future 
horizon.  As before, the announcement  of future  e would  be sufficient  to 
hold inflation  to zero in the future. 
Stepping  back and comparing  this model with the case of backward- 
looking wage setting, we can make the following points. In this model 
with  anticipatory  wage setters, inflation  can be talked  away in the future 
merely by credible announcements  of tight control over such nominal 
variables  as the exchange rate or the money supply. The only problem 
with eliminating  current  inflation  is that wage contracts build in some 
wage stickiness over the duration  of the contracts. One possible policy 
is to reduce inflation  at the same pace as contracts  expire, so as not to 
jeopardize output. But another more aggressive policy is to use an 
exchange rate overvaluation  to reduce inflation  in the time period in 
which  current  contracts  remain  in force. The potentially  contractionary 
effects coming  from  the real  appreciation  are then offset by a temporary 
fiscal  expansion.  The Mundell  strategy  does not need to last longer  than 
the longest contracts, assuming  that  wages are set on the basis of future 
prices, rather  than  on an average  of wages as in John  Taylor's staggered 
contracts  models.41 A temporary  appreciation  is the way around  a set of 
preexisting  wage settlements. Importantly,  in this model, the economy 
does not really  reabsorb  the inflation  that it exports in the initial  period. 
When  the real  exchange  rate  falls, workers  accept the implicit  real  wage 
reduction  without  demanding  a catch-up  in nominal  wages. Because the 
real appreciation  itself in the first  period drives the real wage above its 
long-run  target  level, workers are willing  to see the real wage fall back 
to the target. 
To summarize  the arguments  of this section, the Mundell  mix  of loose 
fiscal policy and tight monetary  policy can reduce the sacrifice  ratio in 
the short  run, and may or may not reduce the sacrifice  ratio in the long 
run.  In the case of backward-looking  wage setting, the real  appreciation 
is a method  of redistributing  the burden  of adjustment  over time, in order 
to make more rapid  gains against inflation  when inflation  is high, and 
accept  the costs of higher  imported  inflation  when inflation  is low. In the 
41.  John B. Taylor, "Rational Expectations  and the Invisible Handshake,"  in James 
Tobin, ed.,  Macroeconomics,  Prices,  and Quantities:  Essays  in Memory of Arthur M. 
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case of forward-looking  wage behavior, the strategy might actually 
reduce  the sacrifice  ratio  to zero, in that  it provides  a vehicle for cutting 
inflation  and maintaining  output in the short period in which existing 
wage contracts remain  in force. Long-term,  painless disinflation  is no 
problem  in the model, under  the (strong)  assumption  that governments 
can make  credible  commitments  to future  noninflationary  policies. 
THE  POLICY  MIX  IN  THE  MULTICOUNTRY  SETTING 
In a world economy in which individual  countries  pursue  policies in 
a noncooperative  setting (that is, without supranational  controls, IMF 
surveillance,  or economic treaties), the previous  analysis will apply on 
a country-by-country  basis. If many countries are simultaneously  at- 
tempting to disinflate, each will have an incentive to pursue a tight 
money, loose fiscal  policy in order  to strengthen  the currency.  Of  course, 
differing  concerns in each country regarding  public deficits or external 
deficits  may vary the vigor  with which the policy mix is pursued. 
In an earlier  study, Gilles Oudiz and I described  in some detail how 
the resulting  noncooperative  global  equilibrium  is likely  to be inefficient, 
in the sense that all countries can come closer to their targets if they 
make some cooperative adjustments  to their policies.42  The reason for 
inefficiency in this particular  case should be clear. In a closed world 
system, not all countries  can simultaneously  appreciate  their  currencies 
vis-a-vis  the other  countries.  Indeed,  in a fully symmetric  setting,  all real 
exchange  rates  between identical  countries  would  be constant  over time 
in  equilibrium,  even though  from  the  perspective  of each  policy  authority, 
the country's own real exchange rate would appear to be a choice 
variable.  The common  attempt  of all countries  to appreciate  will simply 
cancel out. 
To the extent that  there  are side costs to running  large  budget  deficits 
and a tight monetary policy, the (failed) attempt of each country to 
appreciate  will impose pure deadweight  losses on the world economy. 
The policy mix can produce  undesirably  high  world  interest  rates, or too 
rapid growth in public indebtedness, without achieving any inflation 
gains for any individual  country. 
Even if some countries  pursue  the mix more  aggressively  than  others, 
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as is certainly  true for the United States vis-a-vis Europe and Japan  in 
recent  years, the world  equilibrium  is still  likely to be Pareto  inefficient, 
with  a bias towards  excessive budget  deficits  throughout  the world. One 
could surmise,  for example,  that  in the absence of the recent  U.S. policy 
mix, the European and Japanese economies would have maintained 
looser monetary policies, and even tighter fiscal policies, but were 
constrained  from  doing so by fears of further  currency  depreciation.  In 
the earlier  paper, Oudiz  and I used an optimization  framework  to show 
that if the United States were to begin following a policy mix of fiscal 
contraction  and  monetary  expansion,  the optimal  response  of Japan  and 
West Germany  would be to follow with similar changes.43  Similarly, 
using formal  techniques of dynamic  optimization,  Warwick  McKibbin 
and I have given an extended illustration  of how noncooperative  poli- 
cymaking  within  the OECD  is likely to lead to excessive budget  deficits 
and  real  interest  rates in a period  of disinflation.44 
Thus, the Mundell  mix is most  justifiable  from  an individual  country's 
perspective, and is perhaps  actually  pernicious  when viewed from the 
global  perspective. My welfare evaluation  of alternative  policies in the 
next section must therefore  be viewed from a strictly  national  perspec- 
tive, taking  as given the policy actions in the rest of the world. 
POLICY  OPTIMIZATION  IN  A  SIMULATION  MODEL 
This section draws together  the pieces of the analysis by estimating 
optimal  policies for disinflation  in the United States within  a structural 
model of global macroeconomic  adjustment.  The model, designed and 
refined  in joint work with Warwick  McKibbin  and Gilles Oudiz, is a 
dynamic model of the world economy with four regions, the United 
States,  the  ROECD,  nonoil  less developed  countries  (LDCs),  and  OPEC; 
it was specially  designed  for policy optimization  studies. I use the model 
here  for  three  purposes:  to see whether,  in  broad  outline,  the movements 
of the dollar  can be explained  in a structural  model in terms of shifts in 
macroeconomic  policies in the United States and the ROECD;  to see 
whether,  from  the vantage  point  of 1980,  the mix of fiscal  expansion  and 
43.  Ibid., table 14. 
44.  Jeffrey Sachs and Warwick McKibbin,  "Macroeconomic  Policies  in OECD and 
LDC External Adjustment, " Working Paper 1534  (National Bureau of Economic Research, 
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monetary  contraction  had merit  for the United States; and to assess the 
prospects for future  developments  of the U.S. price level and external 
balance, in view of the large  appreciation  of the dollar  since 1980. 
A complete description of the simulation  model is available else- 
where.45  Here, an outline  of the model  will suffice. As a general  matter, 
the model  has several  features  that  make  it particularly  attractive  for the 
type of policy analysis  undertaken  here. First, the important  stock-flow 
relationships and intertemporal  budget constraints are carefully ob- 
served, so that the long-run  properties of the model are reasonable. 
Budget deficits, for example, cumulate  into a stock of public debt that 
must be serviced, while current  account deficits cumulate  into a stock 
of foreign  debt. Second, the asset markets  are forward-looking,  so that 
the exchange rate is conditioned  by the entire future path of policies 
rather  than  by a set of short-run  expectations. This model differs  in this 
fundamental  regard  from  all  of the  large-scale  world  econometric  models. 
In the model, only the developed  country  bloc (the United States and 
the ROECD)  has an internal  macroeconomic  structure;  the LDCs and 
OPEC are modeled only with respect to their international  trade and 
financial  linkages. Each region produces a single output, which is an 
imperfect  substitute  in consumption  for the outputs  of the other  regions. 
Every region therefore  exports and imports  to the other regions, with 
the extent of trade parametrized  on the baseline to correspond to a 
direction-of-trade  matrix for  1983. Importantly, it is  assumed that 
potential  growth  of GDP  is fixed at 3 percent  per year in both the United 
States and the ROECD, so that I do not examine at all the long-term 
growth  effects of alternative  policy mixes. In any event, there  would be 
no easy way to pursue  the more  ambitious  task  of building  in endogenous 
growth of potential GDP as a function of policy variables as crudely 
defined  as government  aggregate  expenditure  and taxation.  A cut in tax 
revenues, for example, can be detrimental  to the growth of potential 
GDP if the tax cut finances  increased  consumption,  while it might  spur 
growth  if the tax cut is made in order  to subsidize  capital  expenditures, 
as with much  of the Reagan  tax cut on capital  income. 
In the United States and the ROECD, output  is demand  determined 
along conventional  lines. In any period, the nominal  wage is predeter- 
45.  Ibid. The main modification to the model in Sachs  and McKibbin is the money 
demand function,  which  is  now  written  in the  form: in,  -  p,  =  O.5(0.9Q, -  0.8i)  + 
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mined, and domestic prices are written  as a fixed markup  over wages. 
While domestic prices are given, consumer prices can of course vary 
within a period because of movements in the nominal  exchange rate. 
Aggregate  demand  is the sum of private  domestic absorption,  exports 
net of imports,  and government  spending,  which is assumed to fall, on 
the margin, entirely on  home goods.  Private absorption combines 
personal  consumption  expenditure  and investment expenditure  in one 
behavioral  relation.  The level of total absorption  is written  as a function 
of disposable  income, defined  as GDP net of taxes; the real interest  rate 
r; and the stock of financial  wealth of households. The real interest  rate 
is the nominal  interest rate minus the rationally  anticipated  change in 
domestic goods prices in the next period. In the version of the model 
reported  here, each period  signifies  one calendar  year. Note that  current 
absorption  is written  as a function  of current  disposable  income rather 
than  permanent  income. This specification,  of course, builds  in a strong 
presumption  that the time path of taxes affects the time path of private 
absorption,  even for a given discounted  value of the total tax burden. 
International  financial flows are assumed to be completely dollar 
denominated,  with ROECD, LDC, and OPEC  residents  holding  dollar 
denominated  assets and liabilities,  but with U.S. residents not holding 
any claims  in nondollar  currencies.  Thus  all current  account  imbalances 
are settled by changes in net U.S. dollar claims and liabilities. Dollar 
assets are assumed to be imperfect substi-utes  for ECU denominated 
assets (the ROECD  currency  bundle  will be termed  the ECU), with the 
required  risk premium  a function, 'a  la Tobin, of the relative stocks of 
ECU and dollar  assets in the ROECD  portfolio. In practice  a very high 
degree  of substitutability  is assumed,  in  line with  the suggestive  evidence 
on real  interest  rates  and the dollar  described  earlier. 
A few of the key parameter  values in the behavioral  equations can 
help  in understanding  the effects of policies in the model. At the point  of 
linearization  the following  elasticities  are assumed: 
-the  effect of a 1 percentage  point increase in the short-term  real 
interest  rate  on private  absorption  expenditure:  decline  of 0.4 percent  of 
absorption 
-the  effect of a $1 increase in inccme on private  absorption  expen- 
diture:  increase  of 700 
-the  effect of a $1 increase  in financial  wealth on private  absorption 
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the effect of a 1 percent  real  appreciation  of the dollar  vis-a-vis the 
ECU on U.S. imports  from  the ROECD:  increase  of 1.5 percent 
-the  effect of a 1 percent real appreciation  of the dollar on U.S. 
exports to Europe:  decline of 1.5 percent 
-the  effect of a 1 percent  increase  in OECD  imports  from  the LDCs 
on LDC  terms  of trade  (that  is, on the  relative  price  of LDC  commodities): 
increase  of 0.5 percent 
-the  effect of a 1 percent  increase in OECD  imports  from  OPEC  on 
the relative  price  of OPEC  exports:  increase  of 0.5 percent. 
The role of the exchange rate on domestic inflation  is based on a 
pricing model that is somewhat different from the structural  model 
derived earlier  in the paper. In the global modeling  for the simulation 
model  it was convenient  to distinguish  goods by country  of origin  rather 
than  by class of commodity.  Goods from  the ROECD  and  the LDCs are 
assumed to enter the consumer price level with a weight equal to the 
ratio of U.S. imports  from each region as a percentage  of U.S. GNP. 
The weight for OPEC is set at 0.04, to reflect both the import and 
domestic  production  effects of a change  in world  oil prices. In particular, 
in the United States the following consumer price index equation is 
specified: 
(28)  pc =  0.89 w +  0.05 pROECD  +  0.02  pLDC  +  0.04  pOPEC. 
It is assumed that for given local currency prices in the ROECD, an 
exchange  rate  change  is passed through  100  percent  within  the year into 
U.S. import  prices  of ROECD  goods. Thus, from  equation  28, the direct 
effect of a 10  percent  depreciation  of the ECU on the U.S. price  index is 
0.5 percent. It is also assumed  that the prices of LDC goods and OPEC 
goods are fixed as markups  over price indexes of OECD  goods from  the 
other  regions, where the markups  are a rising  function  of X, the level of 
total exports. In other  words, the dollar  price of OPEC  exports is given 
as: 
(29)  pOPEC  =  0.09pus  +  0.43 pROECD  +  0.48pLDC  +  0.5 log XOPEC 
The weights here are based on OPEC  import  shares in 1983.  This may 
be regarded  as an OPEC supply curve, making  the supply of exports a 
rising function of the relative export price. The weights attached by 
OPEC  to U.S. prices and  ROECD  prices are assumed  to be fixed  by the 
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been based on the extent of U.S.  and ROECD purchases from OPEC, 
depending on the underlying model of supply.) There is a similar equation 
for LDC pricing, given by: 
(30)  pLDC  =  o  20pus  +  0. 5opROECD  +  0.3OpOPEC  +  0.5 log  XLDC. 
Taking equations  29 and 30 together,  we  can calculate  the direct and 
indirect first-period effect  of a 10 percent currency appreciation of the 
dollar relative to the ECU to be 1 percent. 
As described earlier, the wage equation may be specified as forward- 
or backward-looking, or some combination of the two. The specification 
chosen  allows  for level  and rate-of-change  effects  of output on wage 
inflation. Note  that Q in this equation is to be regarded as the deviation 
of output from trend, that is, as a GDP gap measure. 
(31)  ITWI  =  ctT  +  (1  -  O)tct+I  +  Qt  +  Y(Qt  -  Qt-i) 
Note  that tnc+  1 is the period t expectation  of consumer price inflation in 
period t  +  1, (tpc+  -  pc). For the backward-looking  wage behavior, 
a  =  1. I also set +  =  =  0.2. With +  equal to 0.2, the long-run sacrifice 
ratio is approximately 5, or 1/0.2. 
Under the assumption of backward-looking  wage behavior (oa =  1), 
the  system  just  outlined  has  properties  that are very  close  to  those 
estimated  earlier.  In particular,  consider  the  effects  of  a  10 percent 
appreciation  of  the  dollar in the  model,  and compare  them  with  the 
annual  average  reduction  in  price  inflation  of  the  quarterly  model 
(unconstrained version) estimated earlier (in percentage points): 
Year 
1  2  3 
Quarterly  model  0.7  1.0  0.9 
Simulation  model  1.0  0.9  0.8 
The dynamic effects  of U.S.  fiscal and monetary policies  are shown 
in tables 7 and 8. The fiscal policy  is a sustained,  bond-financed  U.S. 
fiscal expansion.  The  monetary  policy  is a  1 percent  increase  in the 
money supply, expected  to be permanent. The fiscal expansion  begins 
as a 1 percent of GNP rise in government expenditures on home goods, 
with no initial change in taxes.  Over time, the higher expenditure level 
is left unchanged, but taxes are raised in line with rising debt-servicing 
charges, in order to keep the deficit equal to 1 percent of GNP. 172  Rrnakinnov  Pnnorc  on  Frnanmir  Artivitv  1 - 1QR5 
Table 7.  Effects of U.S.  Fiscal Expansion,  1984-87a 
Deviations  from baseline 
Category  1984  1985  1986  1987 
U.S.  GDP in 1984 prices (percent)  0.7  0.9  0.6  0.4 
U.S.  GDP in 1984 prices (billions 
of dollars)  27.0  35.7  24.1  17.1 
U.S.  price inflation (percentage points)  -  0.3  0.0  0.2  0.2 
U.S.  interest rate (percentage  points)  0.7  0.8  1.0  1.2 
U.S.  current account  (percent of 
U.S.  GDP)  -0.5  -0.5  -0.6  -0.6 
U.S.  current account  (billions 
of dollars)  -16.8  -18.9  -  21.6  -  23.6 
U.S.  effective  exchange  rate 
(percent)b  3.8  4.0  4.2  4.3 
OECD  GDP (percent)  0.7  -  0.1  -  0.1  -  0.3 
OECD price inflation (percentage 
points)  0.2  0.4  0.2  0.2 
OECD interest rate (percentage points)  0.6  0.9  0.9  0.9 
a.  Bond-financed  fiscal expansion  of  1 percent  of GNP  rise in government  expenditures.  Over time,  higher level 
of expenditure  is kept constant,  but taxes  are raised. 
b.  Units of basket of foreign currencies  per U.S.  dollar. 
Table 8.  Effects of U.S.  Monetary Expansion,  1984-87a 
Deviations  from baseline 
Category  1984  1985  1986  1987 
U.S.  GDP in  1984 prices (percent)  2.0  -0.5  0.0  -0.4 
U.S.  GDP in 1984 prices (billions 
of dollars)  -  73.4  -  20.1  0.9  16.7 
U.S.  price inflation (percentage points)  0.1  0.7  0.2  0.3 
U.S.  interest rate (percentage  points)  -0.4  0.4  0.2  0.3 
U.S.  current account  (percent 
of U.S.  GDP)  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 
U.S.  current account  (billions 
of dollars)  -  3.5  -  5.4  -  2.7  -  3.1 
U.S.  effective  exchange  rate 
(percent)b  -  0.8  -  0.3  -  0.6  -  0.7 
OECD GDP (percent)  0.0  0.1  0.0  -0.1 
OECD  price inflation (percentage 
points)  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0 
OECD interest rate (percentage points)  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1 
a.  One percent  increase  in the money  supply. 
b.  Units of basket of foreign currencies  per U.S.  dollar. Jeffrey D. Sachs  173 
In the case of a U.S. fiscal expansion, we find a rise in GDP of 0.7 
percent  relative  to the baseline in the first  year, and a fall in inflation  of 
0.3 percentage  point. The inflation  reduction  has two sources, one of 
them  spurious:  on the one hand,  the  fiscal  expansion  causes the exchange 
rate to appreciate  by 3.8 percentage points, which has a direct pass- 
through  effect on import prices, and from them to consumer prices. 
More dubiously, the Phillips curve effect of higher output on prices 
operates  with a full year  lag. In the second year of the shock, inflation  is 
the same as in the baseline. U.S.  short-term  interest rates rise by 70 
basis points in the first year, and by 100  basis points in the third  year. 
The U.S.  current account worsens by about 0.5 percentage point of 
GDP and then continues to worsen in the next three years. Note that a 
4.0 percent  of GNP swing  of fiscal  policy causes a current  account  swing 
of about  2.0 percent  of GNP. This is about  the order  of magnitude  of the 
swing  in fiscal  policy and  the current  account  since 1980:  the model  is on 
track  here. 
As explained  in one of my earlier  studies  with Wyplosz, the short-run 
appreciation  of the  dollar  is reversed  in  the  long  run,  for  several  reasons  .46 
The  persistent  current  account  deficits  of the United States cause a shift 
in world wealth, which tends to diminish  demand  for U.S. goods. The 
share  of dollar  denominated  assets in ROECD  portfolios  rises and over 
time  induces  a growing  risk  premium  on U.S. denominated  claims. U.  S. 
interest rates rise, and the dollar tends to weaken. Importantly,  the 
model  does not signal  any need for a rapid  reversal  of the appreciation, 
as shown in figure  6. The nominal  exchange rate does not return  to its 
initial  level until  about  fifteen  years after  the expansion. 
As shown in table 8, a U.S.  monetary expansion causes a more 
inflationary  boom than does fiscal policy,  since the exchange rate 
depreciates  on impact. Per unit of GDP gain, monetary  policy is more 
inflationary,  but also less adverse to the current  account balance. The 
differential  effects of monetary and fiscal policy have the following 
implications.  A mix of fiscal expansion  (G rising  by 2.0 percent  of GNP) 
and monetary  contraction  (M falling by 0.7 percent relative to trend) 
causes:  no output  change;  an inflation  reduction  of 0.7 percentage  point 
in the first year; and a worsening of the current  account of about 1.1 
percent  of GNP. 
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Figure 6.  Projected Effects of Fiscal Stimulus on ECU-Dollar Exchange Rates, 
1984-2014a 
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Source:  Simulation described  in table 7 and text. 
a.  ECU  is the currency  bundle for the rest of the OECD. 
Can this model hope to reproduce the essential  quantitative aspects 
of the  U.S.  disinflation and strong dollar of the past four years?  The 
answer is yes.  Suppose that the United States and the ROECD were on 
a particular adjustment path until the policy changes of 1981. The changes 
relative to that old baseline are as follows: a sustained U. S. debt-financed 
fiscal expansion  of 4 percent of GNP; a sustained ROECD fiscal con- 
traction of 2 percent of ROECD GNP; a substantial tightening of U.S. 
monetary policy; and no change in ROECD monetary policy. The degree 
of U. S. monetary tightening is calibrated so that the net effect of monetary 
contraction  and fiscal expansion  is a recession  with a GNP gap of 7.5 
percent in the first year, and then a gradual recovery.  This involves  a 
sharp fall in money growth (3.0 percentage points relative to the baseline), 
and then a path of nominal money growth nearly equal to inflation for 
the  next  three  years.  This  policy  setting  yields  the path of  variables 
shown in table 9. The dollar appreciates by 39.4 percent relative to the 
ECU,  and U.S.  short-term real interest  rates  rise by  8.0  percentage 
points relative to abroad. A protracted period of unemployment ensues, 
with the United States returning gradually to full employment.  The U. S. Jeffrey D. Sachs  175 
Table 9.  Simulated Effects of Shift in Policy Mix in the United States and the Rest of the 
OECD (ROECD) after 1980 
Deviations  from baseline,  in percent 
Policy  and variable  1981  1982  1983  1984 
Real exchange  rate  39.4  32.6  29.8  27.1 
Policy  shift 
U.S.  fiscal deficit as proportion 
of GNP  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0 
U.S.  monetary  policya  -  3.0  -  7.1  -  6.5  -  6.7 
ROECD fiscal deficit as proportion 
of GNP  -2.0  -2.0  -2.0  -2.0 
ROECD monetary policya  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Other variables 
U.S.  GNP gapb  -  7.5  -  6.1  -  5.1  -  4.3 
U.S.  price inflation  -  3.7  -  6.2  -  7.0  -  7.6 
U.S.  interest rate  10.0  8.8  7.7  6.9 
ROECD GNP gapb  3.7  -  5.5  -  4.5  -  4.6 
ROECD price inflation  1.4  1.9  0.0  -0.5 
ROECD interest rate  2.0  2.1  0.5  -0.6 
a.  Monetary policy  is defined as the percentage  growth in Mi. 
b.  A negative  sign indicates  output below  potential. 
inflation rate falls from  10 percent  in the year before  the  shift to 6.3 
percent in the first year of the policy,  3.8 percent  the next,  and so on 
gradually to zero inflation. (The table records the drop in inflation relative 
to the 10 percent per year inflation of the baseline.) This simulation does 
not attempt to capture the precise timing of exchange  rate movements. 
For that we would have to assess  the expectations  of the market with 
respect to future policies in every period since 1980. Rather, it illustrates 
that movements  in the value  of the dollar of the magnitude observed 
since 1980 can be captured in simulation exercises  with plausible shifts 
in policy. 
Now, it is time to examine the specific properties of optimal disinflation 
paths in the model. One brief word must be said about the optimization 
technique.  Unlike  the illustration of optimal control  policies  pursued 
earlier, the calculations described below are for so-called "time consis- 
tent" policies,  in which the optimization is made under the assumption 
that the government cannot commit itself at a given moment to the entire 
future path of its actions. Rather, it optimizes today with the understand- 
ing that it will have the opportunity to reoptimize  at each date in the 
future. The government therefore optimizes  today, taking as given that 176  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1  985 
it will  be  optimizing  in the  future.  To  solve  the  problem,  backward 
recursion  is  used;  in each  period  the  government  computes  its  best 
policy,  taking as given the policies  that it will be pursuing in the future. 
Technically,  the  solution  technique  is  dynamic  programming,  rather 
than optimal control.47 
For the utility function,  I employ a quadratic function in the output 
gap, the inflation rate, an adjusted budget deficit relative to GDP, and an 
adjusted current account deficit relative to GDP. Let b, = B,/Q, be the 
ratio of public debt to potential GDP (Q). The adjusted budget deficit 
measure  used  is  (b,+I  -  b,). Similarly,  the  adjusted current account 
measure is the change in net foreign liabilities per unit of potential GDP, 
denoted  d,+I  -  d,. In long-run  equilibrium,  both  b, and  d, reach  a 
constant. This requires that the actual level of public debt and of foreign 
indebtedness  grow at the rate of potential  GDP,  which  I take to be 3 
percent per year. 
The  instantaneous  utility  function  in  period  t  is  written  simply 
Ut =  -[k1(Qt  -  Q)2  +  2Tt  +  t3(b,+1  -  b,)2  +  24(d,+1  -  d,)2].  The 
bliss point in each period is characterized by output at potential (Qt =Q), 
zero  inflation  (s,c  =  0),  and  no  change  in  the  two  debt-GDP  ratios 
(bt+  I -  bt = dt+  I -  dt = 0). At the bliss point, u, = 0; at all other points, 
u, <  0. The intertemporal utility function is an infinite discounted sum of 
all present and future ut, of the form: 
(32)  Ut =  3  (1 +  W)-(s-t)IIM, 
s = t 
where 8 is the pure rate of time preference (set at 0.10 in the simulations 
that follow).  in all of the simulations that follow,  +2  iS  set at 1.0,  ?3  at 
0.1, and (  at 0.5. The value Xl is given three alternative values, signifying 
a  "high"  welfare  weight  on output (+1 =  2.0);  a "medium"  welfare 
weight on output (+1 =  1.0); and a "low"  welfare weight on output (?1 
=  0.5).  The low welfare weight  is selected  to yield roughly a path of 
disinflation of about the rate in effect  during 1981-84.  In particular, it 
produces a recession  in the early stage of disinflation with a GNP gap of 
8.5 percent. 
47.  Gilles Oudiz and Jeffrey Sachs,  "International  Policy  Coordination in Dynamic 
Macroeconomic  Models,"  in Willem H. Buiterand Richard C. Marston, eds.,  International 
Economic  Policv  Coordination (Cambridge University  Press,  1985), pp. 274-319.  For an 
earlier illustration of the technique., see Sachs and McKibbin, "Macroeconomic  Policies. " Jeffrey D. Sachs  177 
The intertemporal utility function is maximized  using dynamic pro- 
gramming  techniques, under the alternative utility assumptions. I assume 
that as of  1981 the  United  States  inherits a wage  inflation rate of  10 
percent, zero output gap, and zero adjusted current account and budget 
deficits. The policy controls  are specified in three alternative ways.  In 
Case I, the optimal policy mix of M and G is selected to maximize  U,. In 
Case II, the policy path is restricted to choices of monetary policy alone, 
with government  spending fixed at a baseline  level.  These  two  cases 
allow  us  to  examine  the  advantages  of using  two  policy  instruments 
rather than one instrument alone.  In a closed  economy,  Cases I and II 
would yield almost identical results (in Tobin's  "funnel"  theory,  there 
would  be  no advantage,  in terms of the  output-inflation trade-off,  to 
having both instruments). In Case III, both M and G vary, but the policy 
authority is obliged  to maintain a policy  mix that keeps  the exchange 
rate constant.  This alternative is implemented by making G, the policy 
instrument, fixing the real exchange  rate, and making M, adjust endog- 
enously to the level consistent  with the exchange rate target. In compar- 
ing Cases  III and I,  we  find the  gains  that can  be  achieved  through 
manipulation of the real exchange rate. 
Table  10 shows  the optimal policy  paths for disinflation from a  10 
percent  inflation rate for backward-looking  wage  behavior  and for a 
variety of utility functions  and policy options.  The results are striking. 
In Case I, where both M and G are freely employed,  the optimal path is 
to  use  expansionary  G  and  contractionary  M.  (Monetary  policy  is 
contractionary in the sense that nominal money growth is far below the 
inflation rate, which, in the model with backward-looking wage behavior, 
tends to produce a decline  in output relative to potential.)  In all cases, 
the three-year sacrifice ratio is lower given this policy mix than with M 
alone, and much lower than with a constant  real exchange  rate policy. 
However,  in all cases,  the infinite-horizon sacrifice ratio is higher with 
the  Mundell policy  mix  than with  M  alone,  or with  a constant  real 
exchange rate. This latter effect results from the fact that in all cases the 
long-run real exchange  rate is more depreciated  in Case  I.  Since  the 
Mundell mix causes a sharp initial appreciation, and an accumulation of 
foreign debt, it also involves  a greater long-run depreciation.48 
48.  Compare this result with my earlier illustration of the Buiter-Miller model, in which 
the long-run sacrifice ratio is fixed.  In that case  I ruled out long-run changes  in the real 
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Table 10.  Optimal Policy Paths for Disinflation, United States, Alternative Utility 
Weightsa 
Sacrifice  ratiob 
Utility weight, policy  Year  Three-  Long- 
path,  and variable  1981  1982  1983  year  run 
Low output weight 
Case I.  Optimal 
policy  mix  3.47  5.20 
Fiscal  policy  5.7  3.7  3.1 
Monetary policy  0.6  1.3  3.5 
Output gapc  -  8.5  -  7.0  -  5.8 
Inflation rate  7.5  4.7  3.9 
Real exchange  rate  27.1  18.7  15.5 
Case  II.  Monetary 
policy  alone  3.93  5.00 
Fiscal  policy  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Monetary policy  2.0  2.3  4.0 
Output gapc  -  9.5  -  7.5  -6.1 
Inflation rate  8.5  5.1  4.1 
Real exchange  rate  15.1  10.7  8.5 
Case III.  Fixed  real 
exchange  rate  4.55  4.97 
Fiscal  policy  -  6.1  -  5.1  -4.1 
Monetary  policy  3.6  4.3  5.1 
Output gapc  -  9.8  -  7.8  -6.3 
Inflation rate  9.8  5.9  4.7 
Real exchange  rate  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Medium output weight 
Case  I.  Optimal 
policy  mix  3.12  5.30 
Fiscal  policy  5.9  4.5  4.1 
Monetary policy  1.8  2.3  4.0 
Output gapc  -  5.9  -  5.2  -  4.6 
Inflation rate  7.5  5.6  4.9 
Real exchange  rate  26.8  20.0  17.5 
Case  II.  Monetary 
policy  alone  3.88  5.00 
Fiscal  policy  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Monetary policy  3.1  3.6  4.9 
Output gapc  -  6.8  -  5.8  -  5.1 
Inflation rate  8.8  6.3  5.4 
Real exchange  rate  12.1  9.1  7.7 
Case III.  Fixed  real 
exchange  rate  4.61  4.97 
Fiscal  policy  -4.4  -4.0  -3.4 
Monetary  policy  4.1  5.2  5.9 Jeffrey D. Sachs  179 
Table 10 (Continued) 
Year  Sacrifice  r  atiob 
Utility weight, policy  Three-  Long- 
path,  and variable  1981  1982  1983  year  run 
Output gapc  -  7.1  -  6.0  -  5.2 
Inflation rate  9.8  7.0  6.0 
Real exchange  rate  0.0  0.0  0.0 
High output weight 
Case  I.  Optimal 
policy  mix  2.65  5.40 
Fiscal policy  6.0  5.2  4.8 
Monetary policy  2.8  2.9  4.6 
Output gapc  -  4.0  -  3.6  -  3.4 
Inflation rate  7.6  6.4  5.9 
Real exchange  rate  26.5  21.0  19.0 
Case II.  Monetary 
policy  alone  3.83  5.00 
Fiscal policy  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Monetary policy  3.9  4.8  5.9 
Output gapc  -  4.7  -4.2  -  3.8 
Inflation rate  9.1  7.4  6.7 
Real exchange  rate  9.1  7.2  6.4 
Case III.  Fixed  real 
exchange  rate  4.67  4.97 
Fiscal policy  -  3.0  -2.8  -  2.5 
Monetary policy  4.6  5.9  6.8 
Output gapc  -  4.8  -4.3  -  3.9 
Inflation rate  9.9  8.0  7.2 
Real exchange  rate  0.0  0.0  0.0 
a.  Entries  are deviations  from baseline.  The  economy  is  assumed  to  inherit a  10 percent  wage  inflation rate in 
1981, with  all  other  target  variables  at  zero.  Fiscal  policy  deviation  is  expressed  as  deficit  as  percent  of  GNP; 
monetary  policy,  as  percent  growth  in MI;  output  gap,  as  percent;  inflation rate,  as  percent;  real exchange  rate 
(ECU-dollar),  as percent. 
b.  Percent-years  output loss  per percentage  point of inflation reduction. 
c.  A negative  sign indicates  output below  potential. 
In all examples,  the optimal policy is an early recession  and a gradual 
recovery.  In Case  I,  the  recession  is  always  brought about  by  slow 
money growth and a rise in G. The case with the low weight on output is 
closest  to the U.S.  experience.  Note  that the deficit initially rises to 5.7 
percent of GNP, and the current account deficit is 1.4 percent of GNP. 
The  exchange  rate  appreciates  by  27  percent  on  impact,  and  then 
depreciates steadily over time, to a new long-run equilibrium level below 
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amount of fiscal expansion also grows. Note that in the "high" case the 
initial deficit is 6.0 percent of GNP. 
The Mundell mix is attractive because it allows for a quick disinflation 
at low output cost,  that is, a low sacrifice ratio, even though it raises the 
sacrifice ratio in the long run. Why such a trade-off is desirable in the 
model is important. The desirability of exploiting the short-run benefits 
of appreciation result from quadratic costs  of inflation, or at least rising 
marginal costs  of inflation, and the implicit assumption that the indirect 
costs  of the policy  mix,  including budget deficits and current account 
deficits,  are small when measured at a zero policy  change baseline.  In 
other words, as in the static model of the previous section,  the economy 
must  have  more  of  an  "inflation  problem"  than  a  "budget  deficit 
problem" or "current account problem" on the baseline.49 Because  of 
quadratic costs  of inflation, it pays to reduce inflation quickly; because 
of  small  welfare  costs  on  the  margin of  budget  deficits  and  current 
account  deficits,  it is worth pursuing the Mundell mix for the sake of 
inflation control. 
The results of the simulation really focus, then, on the output-inflation 
trade-off, without seriously trying to measure the welfare costs of running 
large budget deficits or large current account deficits. Some critics of the 
mix have argued that it has imposed large costs by restricting investment 
expenditure, though Barry Bosworth's  analysis in this volume calls that 
view into question. Others have worried about the political and economic 
ramifications of a large external  U.S.  indebtedness.  Still others  have 
asserted that for given aggregate output levels,  there are major costs  to 
building the nontradables sectors at the expense of tradables, particularly 
since  that  buildup  will  likely  have  to  be  reversed  over  time.  Such 
assertions are plausible, but so far unquantified. I have included a weight 
for them by weighing  the welfare  costs  of budget deficits and current 
account  deficits in the social welfare function.  To the extent  that they 
are to be more highly credited, the result would be to weaken further the 
case  for the strong dollar policy  mix.  In any event,  all of the optimal 
policy paths call for a steady real depreciation after the initial apprecia- 
tion.  However  much the Mundell mix is pursued,  it must be reversed 
over time. 
49.  As  shown  earlier,  this  statement  can  be  given  precise  technical  content  for a 
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Finally,  I reiterate  the  point  that  the  welfare  discussion  is  based 
entirely  on  a  national  welfare  function,  taking  as  given  the  actions 
abroad. A global analysis of global disinflation would likely argue against 
the  attempt  of  any  particular country  to  engineer  a  large  currency 
appreciation. 
Conclusions  and Problems Ahead 
Without the  strong dollar in recent  years,  the United  States  either 
would have had much higher inflation or would still be languishing, as 
is Europe, with double-digit unemployment.  But the future looks some- 
what  bleaker,  now  that  the  U.S.  economy  has  already  enjoyed  the 
benefits  of  the  strong  dollar and faces  the  higher inflation built  into 
the  process  of  unwinding  the  dollar.  As  long  as  the  depreciation  is 
gradual, the actual inflation rate does not have to rise as the dollar falls, 
assuming that domestic  price inflation continues  to fall, which is likely 
if there is continued (and declining) slack in the economy.  As shown in 
Case I above,  with  "low"  output weight,  the unwinding of the dollar 
takes place in the context of steady declines in inflation and a steady rise 
of output to full employment. 
The risks from the current situation come from the possibility  either 
of a sharp drop in the dollar or of a real appreciation that is sustained too 
long.  Note  that the optimal policy  packages  involve  high but steadily 
falling budget deficits,  and certainly not a path of continuing high and 
rising deficits,  as  now  appears  possible  in  the  United  States.  What 
happens, in fact, if the Mundell mix gets stuck, and the deficits remain 
inappropriately high? To investigate  this case,  the model is simulated 
for a permanent exogenous  path of deficits of 4 percent of GNP,  with 
optimum monetary policy that takes the deficit path as given. The major 
effects  of this undesirable fiscal policy  are a sustained path of current 
account deficits and a large long-term decline in private absorption. The 
economy  experiences  an enormous  increase  in external indebtedness, 
and real consumption  is squeezed  in the long run to make room for the 
net exports needed for debt servicing. 
A  final case  to  consider  is  the  implication  of  a  shift  in portfolio 
preferences  against the  dollar,  starting from a situation  of  large real 
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Table 11.  Effects of a Shift in Portfolio Preferences Away from U.S.  Dollar, 1985-88a 
Case  and variable  1985  1986  1987  1988 
Baseline:  no portfolio  shift 
Real exchange  rateb  18.0  14.1  12.1  10.4 
Output gap (percent)c  -  4.8  -  4.0  -  3.4  -  2.8 
Inflation rate (percent)  3.3  2.6  2.2  i.8 
Assumed portfolio  shift, 
with policies  unchanged 
Real exchange  rateb  - 9.5  -  4.3  -  5.7  -  5.8 
Output gap (percent)c  0.5  -  7.5  -  5.5  -  6.3 
Inflation rate (percent)  5.0  6.5  3.6  2.9 
Assumed  portfolio  shift, 
with optimal policy  response 
Real exchange  rateb  0.2  -  1.5  -  2.7  -  3.6 
Output gap (percent)c  -6.1  -  5.0  -  4.1  -  3.4 
Inflation rate (percent)  4.9  3.6  2.0  2.4 
a.  Low  output weight case. 
b.  Departure from long-run equilibrium, in percentage  points. 
c.  A negative  sign indicates  output below  potential. 
the  dollar  begins  to  depreciate,  the  "luster"  on  the  currency  will 
diminish, and a flight from dollars will ensue.  What is the appropriate 
response  of policy in that case,  given that adjustments to such a shock 
will inevitably be painful? 
To study this case,  suppose that inherited inflation is 5 percent at the 
time of the portfolio shift, and that the preceding period's GNP gap was 
5 percent.  Suppose further that an exogenous  and permanent ROECD 
portfolio shift occurs that would result, with unchanged U.S.  policy,  in 
a 27.5 percent depreciation  of the dollar. Optimal monetary and fiscal 
policies  are then applied in response  to this shock.  Table  11 compares 
output and inflation in three cases: no portfolio shift, a portfolio shift but 
no policy  response,  and a portfolio shift with optimal policy  response. 
The utility function settings are for the case of low weight on output. 
By itself, the portfolio shift causes a rise in output in the first year and 
a sharp increase  in inflation.  In principle  the  direction  of  effect  of  a 
portfolio shift on output is ambiguous. When the portfolio shift occurs, 
U.S.  interest rates rise and the real exchange  rate depreciates.  The first 
effect tends to reduce output, while the latter tends to raise output.  In 
the model as specified,  the exchange  rate effect dominates the interest 
rate effect,  as is true of most large-scale  econometric  models  as well. 
However,  by  the  second  year  the  effect  turns  negative.  Optimizing Jeffrey D. Sachs  183 
policymakers  are forced to tighten sharply  in the face of the portfolio 
shift, as shown in the bottom  of table 11.  The economy is pushed  into a 
mild  recession (comparing  the portfolio  shift cum policy response with 
the baseline),  with the output  gap about 1 percent  higher,  and  inflation  1 
percent  higher,  for four years. Thus, even with an optimal  response to 
the  portfolio  shift,  the net  result  is a spurt  in  inflation  and  a mild  recession. 
APPENDIX 
Commodity Prices and the Exchange Rate 
THIS  APPENDIX  describes the derivation  of equation  8, the equation  for 
the dollar  price of primary  commodities  used in the structural  model in 
the text. 
The world is divided into the United States, the rest of the OECD 
(ROECD),  and  the  less developed  countries  (LDCs),  including  the nonoil 
LDCs and OPEC. The exchange rate measures the ECU-dollar  rate, 
where the "ECU" is the weighted average currency  of the ROECD. I 
assume that LDCs peg their currency to  maintain a constant real 
exchange rate vis-a-vis the total OECD area, with the United States 
receiving a weight c- and the ROECD, (1 -  ca)  in the LDC currency 
basket. The term EL denotes the nominal exchange rate of the LDC 
currency vis-a-vis the dollar, and eL  =  log(EL).  Lettingp, p?,  andpL  be 
the  fixed  (log)  output  prices  in  local currencies  in  the three  areas,  assume: 
(A. 1)  eL  =  pL  -  [Ucp  +  (1  -  at)(p0  -  e)]. 
Furthermore,  by the assumption of competitive world trade in Ri, I 
specify  the local currency  price of Ri as: 
(A.2)  pr  in the United States 
pr  +  e in the ROECD 
pr  +  eL  in the LDCs. 
Now, a useful  model  makes  supply  of Ri  in each country  an increasing 
function  of the local relative price of Ri. Assuming a constant supply 
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(A.3)  Ru  =  aou(PR/P)ES  in the United States 
RO?  =  co(PRE/PO)ES  in the ROECD 
Rs  =  XL(P  ELF)  in the LDCs. 
Demand for Ri is written as a negative function of the relative price of 
Ri, and as an increasing function of real national income, with a demand 
elasticity  ED in each area: 
(A.4)  RU  =P3U(PRIP)/-EDyS  in the United States 
RO =3R(PRE/PO)  in the ROECD 
RD  =  L(PE/P)YL  in the LDCs. 
Equilibrium requires that the world supply RSW  ( = RSU  + RS?  + RS) equal 
world demand RDW  (=  RDU  + RO +  R  L): 
(A.5)  RW=  RW 
The conceptual experiment asks how a percentage change in E affects 
the dollar price pR  of commodity  Ri, holding fixed the output prices P 
and PO. To solve this problem, we logarithmically differentiate A.3 and 
A.4 and note that the percentage  changes in world supply and demand 
may be written as: 
(A.6)  drw =  Oudrsu  +  O0dr?  +  (1 -  Ou  -  O?)drsl 
drDw  =  OudrDu  +  o?dro +  (1  -  Ou  -  O3)drD-, 
where OSu  and 09 are the shares of the United States and the ROECD in 
supply of RW(Ou  and OD  are analogously defined) at the initial equilibrium. 
Remember,  finally, that by assumption  d(eL  -  pL)  =(1  -  c)de.  The 
equality follows  from equation  A.1.  A bit of algebra yields  a general 
expression  for dpr: 
(A.7)  dp'  =  [ydp +  (1 -  y)(dp? -  de)] +  Pdyw, 
where  dyw =  0ouDYu+ Oo?dyo  +  (1 -  Ou  -  OO)dyL,  and 
E= {ED[IU(1  -  Ot) +  (1  -  O0)0t] +  E [00O 
+  (1  -  )(  -  OSU)]}/(ED  +  Es) 
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Note that  pr  changes in proportion  to a weighted  average  of changes in 
p and (p0  -  e),  and also in response to changes (weighted) in world 
income  yt'. The term y is the weight attached  to U.S. prices and (1 -  y) 
is the corresponding  weight  for ROECD  prices. 
According  to equation  A.7, the effect of an exchange  rate change  on 
pr  is  given by dprlde  =  - (1 -  y). It is easy to compute dprlde for a 
number  of special cases. If the United States is "small" in the world, in 
the sense that Ou =  Ou  =  0, then dprlde  =  -  1. This is the standard 
case that for a small country, an exchange appreciation  lowers traded 
good prices one for one. If the United States is dominant  in the OECD, 
with c- =  1 and  Ou  = Ou  =  1, then  dprlde  = 0. In this case, an exchange 
depreciation  would have no effect on dollar  commodity  prices. Third,  if 
the U.S.  shares of the OECD production  and consumption  of Ri are 
equal, and are in turn  equal to c-  (the weight of the United States in the 
LDC exchange  basket),  then dprlde  =  1 -  ca. The larger is the U.S. 
weight, the smaller is the exchange rate effect on dollar commodity 
prices. Comments 
and Discussion 
Stanley Fischer: Every year at this time the youngest child present 
stands up and asks four questions.  I They are: How much  did the dollar 
appreciation  contribute to disinflation?  Can the policy mix explain 
changes  in the exchange  rate?  Should  we expect a depreciation  that  will 
offset the effects of the appreciation?  Was  the optimal  strategy  followed 
even so? 
The answers to the four questions are very long. They begin with a 
reference to our forefathers,  in this case Robert Mundell. A series of 
interesting stories-in  all likelihood based on fact-is  presented to 
interest  us in the problem.  For instance, the generally  declining  money 
growth  rate  since 1981  is almost  a fact, though  difficult  to find  in the data. 
The Mundell  article is indeed brilliant,  and it does suggest the tight 
money, easy fiscal policy mix, but it certainly  does not  justify that mix 
by its effects on the exchange rate. Mundell simply announces that 
monetary  policy  determines  the inflation  rate  and  fiscal  policy  determines 
output, and that is it.  But it would be churlish to object to  slight 
inaccuracies  in interpreting  the historical  sources, because it is a sign of 
a living  religion  when  the disciples  reinterpret  the prophets  in meaningful 
ways that  appeal  to the modern  generation. 
Now to substance.  Jeff  Sachs  gives more  or  less conventional  answers 
to the four questions. First, he argues that the dollar appreciation  did 
contribute  substantially  to the disinflation  between 1980  and 1984.  Both 
the successive Phillips-curve-type  models in the first part of the paper 
and the McKibbin-Oudiz-Sachs  (MOS) model, which incorporates  a 
similar  Phillips  curve, at the end attribute  about 30 to 40 percent of the 
disinflation  to the exchange  rate  appreciation.  Second, the  MOS  model- 
an enlarged multi-regional  Mundell-Fleming  model-implies  that the 
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policy mix was largely  responsible  for the exchange rate appreciation. 
Third,  Sachs argues  that there will be a dollar  depreciation  back to the 
level of 1977. And finally, the U.S.  strategy was almost optimal. The 
error  is that  fiscal  tightening  did not begin  earlier. 
As a preliminary  comment, let me note that thinking  in terms of the 
policy mix can be slightly misleading. If a stabilization  program  is to 
reduce the inflation  rate, the growth rate of money has to be reduced, 
sooner or later. The policy mix question is whether  both monetary  and 
fiscal policy should start out restrictive, or whether one should be 
restrictive  and one expansionary,  and if so, which?  But there is no way 
of reducing  the inflation  rate in the long run  without eventually  cutting 
the growth  rate of money. The long-run  equivalent  of short-run  "easy 
money" is not a high growth rate of money, but rather  a high ratio of 
money to bonds in the economy. 
It is worth drawing  attention to Sachs's interesting  finding  that the 
long-run  sacrifice ratio is larger  with real exchange rate appreciation 
than  without. This is because the interest  on the external  debt accumu- 
lated during the disinflation  period has to be repaid through a real 
depreciation  larger  than the initial  appreciation.  Since Sachs uses only 
backward-looking  expectations in the Phillips  curve, there is no long- 
run  benefit,  in terms  of lost output,  from  a quick  initial  disinflation. 
I will direct my remaining  remarks  to four issues: first, the Sachs 
estimates of the sacrifice ratio; second, the model of the role of the 
exchange  rate in the disinflation;  third,  the predictions  of dollar  depre- 
ciation;  and  fourth,  the question  of optimal  policy. 
Sachs's calculated sacrifice  ratios are too low. With unemployment 
still  above the natural  rate, the output  loss of 21.5 percent  of GNP is low; 
the slowdown  in inflation  to 2.4 percent  is exaggerated.  On the assump- 
tions that the stabilization  effort began at the end of 1979  and that full 
employment  will be restored  in mid-1986,  the sacrifice  ratio  is about  4.5. 
But however the sacrifice  ratio is calculated, the loss in output in the 
current  disinflation  is at the low end of earlier  estimates. An estimate  of 
4.5 is consistent  with Okun's  lower bound  estimate of 6, when adjusted 
for the shift  in the Okun's  law coefficient. 
In 1982,  Robert  Gordon  and Stephen  King  anticipated  a low sacrifice 
ratio  in a vector autoregressive  model that included  the exchange  rate.2 
2.  Robert  J.  Gordon  and  Stephen  R.  King,  "The  Output  Cost  of  Disinflation  in 
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In his paper  in this volume, by contrast,  Gordon  finds  no special  role for 
the exchange  rate. A correct  deduction  is that exchange  rate effects are 
difficult  to pin  down  statistically.  In  a paper  referred  to by Sachs, Rudiger 
Dornbusch  and I find relatively large exchange rate effects on wages, 
but those effects are statistically significant  only when the post-1980 
period is included in the regression.3  Our interpretation  is that during 
the post-1980  period there was a sectoral effect of foreign competition 
on wages in particular industries, such as  automobiles, that were 
suffering  from  foreign  competition. 
Now why should  the path of the exchange rate matter?  Sachs points 
to a direct effect of import  prices on consumer goods prices, a direct 
effect of import  prices on input  prices, and a competitiveness  effect by 
which  lower  import  prices squeeze domestic  profit  margins.  The dynam- 
ics of adjustment  to a change in policy will thus not be independent  of 
the path  of the exchange  rate. 
All these mechanisms  are  included  in Sachs's Phillips  curve  estimates 
at the beginning  of the paper  and  in the MOS  model  at the end. However, 
they are not directly relevant to the issue of whether the path of the 
exchange  rate  affects  the long-run  sacrifice  ratio.  Dornbusch4  and  Willem 
Buiter  and  Marcus  Miller'  have shown that  the path  of the exchange  rate 
has no effect on the sacrifice  ratio  in a disinflation  if the Phillips  curve is 
linear,  if expectations  in the Phillips  curve are backward-looking,  and if 
the real equilibrium  is the same after the disinflation  as before. Sachs 
demonstrates  that result  in this paper  too. 
Put  simply,  in such  models  it takes  a specific  amount  of unemployment 
to reduce  the inflation  rate  permanently  by 1  percentage  point.  The Sachs 
model has a linear Phillips curve and backward-looking  expectations, 
and  thus has the same property.  In what sense, then, can the path  of the 
exchange rate matter  for the costs of disinflation?  In the first  place, the 
model may be missing some ingredient.  Franco Modigliani  and Lucas 
3.  Rudiger Dornbusch  and Stanley  Fischer,  "The  Open Economy:  Implications  for 
Monetary  and  Fiscal  Policy,"  Working  Paper  1422 (National  Bureau  of  Economic 
Research, August 1984). 
4.  Rudiger Dornbusch,  "Inflation Stabilization and Capital Mobility,"  Working Paper 
555 (National  Bureau of  Economic  Research,  September  1980). Dornbusch  in private 
conversation  attributes this result to Franco Modigliani. 
5.  Willem  Buiter and Marcus  Miller,  "Real  Exchange  Rate  Overshooting  and the 
Output Cost of Bringing Down Inflation," Euiropean  Econonmic  Reviewv,  vol.  18 (May-June 
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Papademos  looked for direct effects of the growth rate of money on 
inflation, effects  that were over and above any operating through 
aggregate  demand.6  Another  possibility  is that  expectations  are  forward- 
looking,  so that  the expectation  of restrictive  policy reduces  the inflation 
rate.7  Or perhaps  the world is nonlinear.  Or there may be a permanent 
change in the real exchange rate-for  instance, as in Sachs's model at 
the end of the paper, when the real exchange rate has to depreciate  to 
generate  the interest on the debt incurred  in the disinflation  process. I 
believe that expectations are to some extent forward-looking,  and that 
the path  of the exchange  rate  therefore  does affect the sacrifice  ratio, by 
producing  quick  results  on the inflation  front. 
Alternatively,  the sacrifice  ratio  may be a poor utility  function.  When 
Sachs, at the end of the paper, calculates optimal  policies, he does so 
using a quadratic  utility  function  with a target  inflation  rate of zero and 
with discounting.  In that situation, there is a utility gain to reducing  a 
high  inflation  rate quickly, and that is why optimal  policy starts  with an 
exchange  rate appreciation. 
The third issue is that of the dollar depreciation.  Sachs's exchange 
rate equation  is for the deutsche mark-dollar  rate. He explains the real 
exchange  rate by the relative  cyclical positions of the United States and 
West Germany, and by the long-term real interest rate differentials 
between  the two countries.  The interest  rate  differentials  do most of the 
work,  but  they are  extremely  problematic,  because  the  expected  inflation 
rate is not observable. The proxy for the expected inflation  rate is the 
average  of inflation  one year ahead  and one year behind.  This is simply 
not credible  when the period  over which expectations  are being  formed 
is about  six years. Sachs has the long-term  expected inflation  rate in the 
United  States down to about  4 percent  already  by the beginning  of 1983. 
It is doubtful  indeed  that  that  was the typical  market  expectation nor is 
a long-term  inflation  rate expectation of 3 percent by the beginning  of 
1984  plausible. 
Accordingly,  the exchange rate equation  is hard  to trust. Suspicions 
should  be  reinforced  by the  low Durbin-Watson,  to which  Sachs  modestly 
6.  Franco Modigliani and Lucas  Papademos,  "I'argets  for Monetary  Policy  in the 
Coming Year," BPEA, 1:1975, pp. 141-65. 
7.  Stanley Fischer,  "Real Balances,  the Exchange Rate, and Indexation: Real Varia- 
bles in Disinflation,"  Discussion  Paper  1497 (National  Bureau of  Economic  Research, 
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points. The serial correlation  of the errors is entirely consistent with 
changing  expectations of the long-term  real exchange rate. Thus, the 
exchange rate equation  brings very little evidence to bear on whether 
the real exchange  rate  will return  to its 1977  level. 
The U.S. current  account deficit is too large to be sustainable.  The 
dollar  will at some stage depreciate. But equations  like those in table 5 
do not tell us how far it will go. We currently  have no good basis for 
predicting  how large  are sustainable  U.S. deficits.  The deficit  is small  as 
a percentage  of total foreign  wealth, and foreigners  may for some time 
want  to continue  adding  substantially  to their  holdings  of dollar  assets. 
The final  issue is that  of optimal  policy. Using the MOS  model, Sachs 
finds  policy to have been close to optimal,  because  the starting  point  was 
a time of high  inflation.  I think  that conclusion  is right,  as is the qualifier 
that  fiscal  policy should  have turned  restrictive  sooner. 
But there are some doubts. First, the MOS model is very much a 
black  box. It is a generalized  Mundell-Fleming  model  with  large  interest 
rate and wealth effects on aggregate  demand,  and strong  exchange rate 
effects on trade  flows. Whether  a particular  policy mix  is optimal  depends 
very much on dynamics-for  instance of the J curve-but  we are not 
given much  information  on this score. 
Second,  as Sachs  appreciates,  the strategy  of overvaluing  the  currency 
is not for everyone. Every LDC that has had a debt crisis has tried at 
some earlier stage to stabilize inflation  by overvaluing  the currency. 
Those that did not succeed-and  that means all of them-found  them- 
selves in deep trouble,  the results  of which we are still seeing around  the 
world. 
Maurice Obstfeld: Jeffrey Sachs argues that the early stages of an 
optimal  disinflation  policy are characterized  by tight monetary  policy, 
fiscal ease, and a steep appreciation  of the currency.  Nominal  appreci- 
ation  buys a rapid  fall in inflation  early  on, when inflation  is most costly, 
while fiscal expansion softens the effect of monetary contraction on 
output. Subsequently,  the currency should depreciate as full employ- 
ment and price stability are regained. Sachs suggests that the dollar's 
appreciation  has played a key role in the decline of U.S. inflation  since 
1980,  but he foresees a significant  and  possibly inflationary  depreciation 
in coming  years. 
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no surprise that the mix emerges as  an optimal policy in various 
simulation models employed in this paper. Sachs's analysis of the 
dynamic  implications  of Mundell'  s short-term  view is a useful  theoretical 
contribution. Loosely  speaking, quadratic policymaker preferences 
imply that it is optimal to "borrow" low inflation  when the marginal 
disutility,  of inflation  is high, and to repay that loan later  when inflation 
and  its marginal  disutility  have come down. Borrowing,  in this context, 
takes the form of a sharp  exchange rate appreciation  that is paid back 
later, as lower fiscal deficits, looser money, and the unwinding  of any 
initial  overshooting  depreciate  the  currency.  It  is worth  repeating  Sachs  's 
point-a  point not really pursued  in this paper-that  lower inflation  is, 
quite literally, borrowed  from abroad, in the sense that a sharp  dollar 
depreciation  leads to an initial  rise in inflation  in the rest of the OECD. 
Presumably,  the short-term  disinflationary  benefits  of the policy mix are 
negated if foreign countries are unwilling  to make the initial loan and 
respond  by adopting  a similar  fiscal-monetary  stance. 
It is also worth  noting  that  Mundell's  game, if played  at all, is one that 
should be played by large countries only, or by a large coalition of 
countries. I will argue shortly that a small country might  well wish to 
couple monetary  contraction  with fiscal contraction. 
Sachs does not push the claim that U.S. macroeconomic  policy has 
been in any sense optimal  in recent years, although  he implies that the 
initial  policy mix was correct in its orientation. Sachs's analysis also 
implies significant  policy overkill. Consider the model leading to his 
equation  24b, which can be written  as 
Rt,=  OQTt, 
where  fl is the  ratio  of the  weights  that  the  policymaker  places  on inflation 
and  the real  exchange  rate. This expression  equates the marginal  rate  of 
substitution  between real appreciation  and inflation  to the marginal  rate 
of transformation  of 0. Take 0 = 0.15 and assume an optimal  policy in 
1981,  with a real exchange rate 15 percent higher  than a 1980  base and 
an  inherited  CPI  inflation  rate  of 10  percent.  Revealed  preference  implies 
a Ql  value  of 10. Using the inflation  rates  for 1982-1981  and 1983-1982  of 
5.9 percent  and 3 percent, respectively, the optimal  real appreciations 
in 1982  and 1983, relative to 1980, are 8.9 percent and 4.5 percent. In 
fact, the real exchange rate, rather than declining, was 24.1 percent 
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government  budget  deficit  as a percentage  of GNP has not yet begun  to 
decline, as prescribed  by Sachs's simulations. 
Another  implication  of the foregoing  arithmetic  is that policymakers 
will opt for a large  initial  appreciation  only when they weigh the costs of 
inflation  heavily  relative  to those of real  exchange  rate  change  or current 
account  deficits. Is this a reasonable  presumption?  Sharp  movements  in 
the exchange  rate  may  entail  severe losses for the economy as resources 
move out of the tradable  goods sectors into sectors favored  by govern- 
ment demand. If the temporary  nature of the real appreciation  were 
understood, exporting and import-competing  firms could borrow to 
cover costs in anticipation  of the exchange  rate reversal.  But this is not 
always  possible in practice,  and  a more  likely  outcome  is a rising  clamor 
for protection  from imports. Indeed, this is one of the most dangerous 
consequences of the current real exchange rate configuration  among 
OECD  countries.  1 
This brings  me back to the applicability  of Sachs's analysis to small 
countries. Here, fiscal expansion  is likely to have quite small  effects on 
overall  aggregate  demand  but significant  effects on the allocation  of that 
demand  among  industries.  To minimize  the sectoral  dislocations  follow- 
ing  an exchange  rate  appreciation  caused  by monetary  tightening,  it may 
be best to reduce  government  spending  so as to hold the real exchange 
rate steady. 
Mundell's 1971 policy mix was, in fact, prescribed  for a world of 
exchange  rates  pegged  to the dollar.  Under  that  regime,  fiscal  expansion 
in the United States would have led to no sudden  real appreciation,  but 
instead  to a sharp  reduction  in the rest of the world's money supply  and 
a gradual  rise in the U.S. price  level relative  to those in other  countries. 
In addition,  Mundell  envisioned  loose fiscal  policy as taking  the form  of 
a tax cut, which  presumably  would  have caused less sectoral  dislocation 
than an equivalent  fiscal stimulus  that shifts aggregate  demand  toward 
defense-related  industries. Neither Mundell nor Sachs considers the 
effect of the policy mix on capital  accumulation  at home and  abroad. 
Sachs's case for a "strong-currency"  approach  to disinflation  hinges 
1.  Since  the  early  1970s,  changes  in  real  exchange  rates,  rather than  aggregate 
employment fluctuations, seem to have served as the main pretext for pressures within the 
United  States  to  restrict  foreign  trade.  C.  Fred  Bergsten  discusses  the  case  of  U.S.- 
Japanese trade in "What to Do about the US-Japan Economic  Conflict," Foreign Affairs, 
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in an important  way on the linkage  between the dollar's value and the 
U.S.  price level. In the absence of this link, fiscal policy might still 
furnish  a means of cushioning  real output  (the main  point of Mundell's 
analysis),  but it would certainly  be less attractive.  Much  of the paper  is 
therefore  devoted to empirical  evidence on the inflationary  effects of 
exchange  depreciation. 
The question  one would  like to answer  is: how would  the time path  of 
inflation  have differed  if the policy mix of 1981  had been implemented 
under  fixed exchange rates? I am not sure how the partial-equilibrium 
model in the first  part  of the paper  throws light on this question. Aside 
from some obvious problems of specification and identification,  the 
interpretation  of the simulations  is unclear. It is hard to envision an 
"exogenous" shock to an endogenous variable-the  exchange rate- 
that leaves unchanged  all other endogenous  variables  except prices. In 
general, the relation  between an exchange rate change and subsequent 
price movements will depend on the fundamental  exogenous change 
perturbing  the economy. For example, an adverse shift in world con- 
sumption preferences will cause depreciation and a fall in domestic 
goods' prices, while monetary expansion will cause depreciation  and 
domestic inflation.  It would be interesting  to use the Sachs-McKibbin 
model to compare  the effect of fiscal  policy on inflation  under  fixed and 
floating  nominal  exchange  rates. This simulation  would  make  the foreign 
price level an endogenous variable, and one which generally  behaves 
differently  under  the two exchange  rate  regimes. 
Much discussion at this meeting has focused on whether the dollar 
will drop, how far, and how fast. Sachs presents his evidence and 
concludes that market  expectations entail a dollar  depreciation  against 
the deutsche mark  of roughly  30 percent over a period of about seven 
years. The chief analytical  tool underlying  the calculation  is the expec- 
tations  theory  of international  nominal  interest  differentials,  also known 
as the interest  parity  condition. A now extensive body of econometric 
research  rejects  the hypothesis that nominal  interest  differentials  equal 
expected depreciation rates, but no competing theory has received 
strong  empirical  support.  Nominal interest parity implies that interna- 
tional real  interest differentials equal expected real  exchange rate 
depreciation  rates; if the expectations  theory holds, as Sachs assumes, 
real  interest  differentials  can be used to forecast real exchange  rates. 
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eventual real depreciation  of the dollar, essentially because everything 
that one might  reasonably  anticipate  happening  points in that  direction. 
In the long run, the real exchange  rate depends on technology, private 
sector preferences,  fiscal  policies, and the world  distribution  of wealth. 
Technological  and taste changes are probably  impossible to forecast. 
That leaves  the U.S.  current account deficit and the likely future 
evolution  of OECD  fiscal stances, both of which point  to a long-run  real 
depreciation. 
I differ  with Sachs concerning  the extent of the real  depreciation.  His 
calculation  requires  assumptions  both about the time required  for the 
world economy to reach long-run  equilibrium  and about the nature  of 
inflation expectations. He  estimates the length of the long run by 
assuming that the expected long-run real exchange rate has been a 
constant since 1977,  and then regressing  the current  real exchange rate 
on his measure  of the real  interest  differential.  Jeffrey  Shafer  and  Bonnie 
Loopesko have run a very similar  regression on monthly data for the 
sample  period  August 1973  to March  1982,  finding  a coefficient  less than 
half the size of those reported  by Sachs.2  What  these conflicting  results 
suggest is that one cannot  justifiably  interpret  the correlation  between 
the real interest differential  and the real exchange rate as a structural 
parameter  measuring  the length of the transition  period. Sachs's as- 
sumption  that the expected long-run  real exchange rate was constant 
over the sample is troublesome. That assumption  would certainly be 
invalid  now. Future  reductions  in U.S. federal  spending,  as they occur, 
should  bring  a fall in the dollar's  real  long-run  value; surely  the markets 
anticipate  this. 
Sachs's modeling of inflation  expectations is worrisome  as well. A 
two-year centered moving average of actual inflation rates may not 
capture  inflation  expectations  over the longer  term,  and  casual  evidence 
from the bond markets suggests that Sachs's measure of long-run 
expected U.S. inflation  is an underestimate.  A corollary  of the expecta- 
tions theory  of nominal  interest  differentials  is an expectations  theory  of 
2.  Jeffrey R. Shafer and Bonnie  E.  Loopesko,  "Floating  Exchange  Rates after Ten 
Years,"  BPEA,  1:1983, pp.  1-70.  Shafer and Loopesko  do not interpret their estimated 
coefficients  as adjustment speeds.  More recent estimates  similar to Sachs's  are reported 
in Peter Hooper,  "International Repercussions  of the U.S.  Budget Deficit,"  International 
Finance  Discussion  Paper 246  (Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System, 
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the term  structure  of nominal  interest  differentials:  international  interest 
rate  parity  at all maturities  implies  that the interest  differential  between 
T-period  bonds  denominated  in different  currencies  is approximately  an 
average of the differentials  on one-period bonds expected to prevail 
between today and date T. At present, long-term nominal interest 
differentials  between the United States and West Germany  are roughly 
200 basis points above short-term  differentials.  Under  the expectations 
theory, this implies an expected rise in the U.S.-West German  short- 
term real interest differential,  an expected future increase in relative 
U.S. inflation,  or some of each. Given the probable  future  evolution of 
fiscal positions within  the OECD, I find  the expected-inflation  explana- 
tion of the current  international  term  structure  most plausible.  While  the 
real value of the dollar should be expected to fall, I am not convinced 
that  markets  expect it to fall as far as its 1977  level. 
General Discussion 
Several Panel members discussed Jeffrey Sachs's model of policy 
reaction. Christopher  Sims emphasized  the possible weakness of mod- 
eling wage behavior in a way that prevents it from reacting  to policy 
changes. He suggested that the result be compared with results that 
would  come from  relaxing  this  restriction.  Sims  also noted  that  the utility 
function  that Sachs assumes is separable,  so that the smoothness  of the 
inflation  path  does not matter.  A plausible,  perhaps  superior,  alternative 
that  attributed  disutility  to changes  in the inflation  rate  might,  in general, 
show quite different  optimal  policies. Sims agreed  that Sachs's formu- 
lation might be adequate in the present episode; inflation  had run up 
quickly,  creating  a political  consensus to reduce it. Martin  Baily added 
that squaring  inflation in the utility function produces Sachs's main 
policy finding  favoring  reduced inflation  now at the expense of higher 
inflation  later. He could see no presumption  that  reducing  inflation  from 
11  to 10  percent  added  several  times more  utility  than  reducing  it from  2 
to 1  percent,  which is what the squared  term  implies. 
William  Nordhaus  suggested  that  Sachs's analysis  should  focus more 
on the important  findings  of an earlier  paper  by Gilles Oudiz  and Sachs 
comparing  cooperative and noncooperative policies among nations 
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setting,  policy reactions  abroad  would move all countries  toward  a mix 
in which monetary  policy was too restrictive  and fiscal policy too easy. 
This  mix  results  because  each country  tries  to export  its inflation,  though 
collectively they cannot do so.  Nordhaus also noted that it is very 
difficult  to reverse  an  easy fiscal  policy, as recent  U. S. experience  shows. 
Allowing for costs  of changing policy could substantially attenuate 
Sachs's prescription. 
Nordhaus  questioned  the use of long-term  real interest  rate differen- 
tials to explain  exchange  rate  movements. He noted that  short-term  real 
interest  rate differentials  were near zero, so that they would predict  no 
movement in exchange rates in Sachs's model. Thus the explanatory 
power of the long-term  interest  rate differentials  rests on the steepness 
of the yield curve in the term structure  of interest rates. If the term 
structure  is taken  to represent  expectations  of sharply  rising  short-term 
rates, the long-term  rate is appropriate  for Sachs's purpose. But that 
interpretation  is supported  neither  by surveys of interest  rate expecta- 
tions nor by the demonstration  by Robert Shiller, John Campbell,  and 
Kermit Schoenholtz (BPEA, 1:1983) that the term structure has no 
predictive  value  for  future  short-term  rates.  If, instead,  the  term  structure 
represents  a risk premium  on long-term  bonds, then bonds are inappro- 
priate  for Sachs's analysis, and the short-term  interest  rate differential 
should  be used instead, with very different  results. 
Nordhaus  doubted  Sachs's assumption  that  before the 1980  election, 
inflation  expectations  were near 10  percent  if Carter  won but, if Reagan 
won, could be represented  by the actual inflation  rates that ensued. He 
pointed  out that surveys of inflation  showed little impact  of the election 
on inflation  expectations.  Furthermore,  to explain  the  dollar  appreciation 
that has occurred, Sachs's model indicates that expected real interest 
rates must have been lower in the United States than abroad; the 
implication  is that expected inflation  in recent years has been much 
higher  than  experienced  inflation. 
George von Furstenberg  showed that so long as the inflation  rate 
depends  on the exchange  rate,  expectations  about  inflation  and  exchange 
rates must be determined  simultaneously.  When exchange rates move 
in an unpredicted  way, inflation  rates will do likewise, making  it impos- 
sible to use observed inflation  rates to infer  expected real interest  rates 
as Sachs does. Von Furstenberg  offered, as an example,  a case in which 
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higher  in the United States than  in West Germany,  so that  expected real 
interest rates were equal and, according to Sachs's model, no real 
exchange rate change would be expected. If the dollar were then to 
appreciate  by 10  percent  and  if, as a consequence,  the  inflation  differential 
were to turn  out to be zero instead  of 3 percent, it would appear  ex post 
that U.S. real interest  rates were three points higher  than  those in West 
Germany.  But this difference cannot be used to explain the exchange 
rate movement  because, ex ante, the expected real interest difference 
was zero. 
George Perry  objected to Sachs's method of calculating  the experi- 
enced sacrifice  ratio. Sachs chose late 1980  as his starting  point  because 
foreign exchange markets began to recognize the U.S. disinflation  at 
that  time;  but  the disinflation  policy had  actually  started  in October  1979, 
and  its effects on unemployment  and  output  had  been  felt soon  thereafter. 
By late 1980, unemployment  was already up a couple of points and 
inflation  was just starting  to slow, making  a sacrifice ratio calculated 
starting  from  that  time artificially  low. 
Edmund  Phelps suggested two possible effects through  which the 
fiscal-monetary  mix  could  play  a special  role  in  improving  the  disinflation- 
output  mix, in addition  to the role assigned  to the mix by Sachs. The first 
effect rests on the assumptions  that monetary policy can bring down 
inflation  without  recession if it has full  credibility  and  that  this credibility 
depends on the rate of money growth. In this case, if policy reduces 
inflationary  expectations by reducing  the money supply, interest rates 
will fall, thus increasing  the demand for money at the initial level of 
output. If the money supply expands to meet this higher demand, 
credibility  may be lost; if it is not allowed  to expand, output  will fall. An 
expansionary  fiscal policy can, in this case, restore the level of output 
without losing the anti-inflation  credibility that depends on money 
growth.  Phelps's second effect rests on getting a positive labor supply 
response to tax cuts. If the response is significant,  adding  tax cuts to 
monetary  restraint  will raise the unemployment  rate, and hence the 
disinflation,  that is associated  with any level of output. 